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Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically
Well-Behaved Potential Games∗
Diodato Ferraioli† Carmine Ventre‡
Abstract
Convergence rate and stability of a solution concept are classically measured in terms of “even-
tually” and “forever”, respectively. In the wake of recent computational criticisms to this approach,
we study whether these time frames can be updated to have states computed “quickly” and stable for
“long enough”.
Logit dynamics allows irrationality in players’ behavior, and may take time exponential in the
number of players n to converge to a stable state (i.e., a certain distribution over pure strategy pro-
files). We prove that every potential game, for which the behavior of the logit dynamics is not
chaotic as n increases, admits distributions stable for a super-polynomial number of steps in n no
matter the players’ irrationality, and the starting profile of the dynamics. The convergence rate to
these metastable distributions is polynomial in n when the players are not too rational.
Our proofs build upon the new concept of partitioned Markov chains, that might be of indepen-
dent interest, and a number of involved technical contributions.
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tential Games
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent assumptions in game theory dictates that people are rational. This is con-
trasted by many concrete instances of people making irrational choices in certain strategic situations,
such as stock markets [35]. This might be due to the incapacity of exactly determining one’s own utili-
ties: the strategic game is played with utilities perturbed by some noise.
Logit dynamics [7] incorporates this noise in players’ actions and then is advocated to be a good
model for people behavior. In more detail, logit dynamics features a rationality level β ≥ 0 (equivalently,
a noise level 1/β) and each player is assumed to play a strategy with a probability which is proportional
to her corresponding utility and β. So the higher β is, the less noise there is and the more rational players
are. Logit dynamics can then be seen as a noisy best-response dynamics.
The natural equilibrium concept for logit dynamics is defined by a probability distribution over the
pure strategy profiles of the game. Whilst for best-response dynamics pure Nash equilibria are stable
states, in logit dynamics there is a chance, which is inversely proportional to β, that players deviate
from such strategy profiles. Pure Nash equilibria are then not an adequate solution concept for this
dynamics. However, the random process defined by the logit dynamics can be modeled via an ergodic
Markov chain. Stability in Markov chains is represented by the concept of stationary distributions. These
distributions, dubbed logit equilibria, are suggested as a suitable solution concept in this context due to
their properties [4]. For example, from the results known in Markov chain literature, we know that every
game possesses a logit equilibrium and that this equilibrium is unique. The absence of either of these
guarantees is often considered a weakness of pure Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, as for Nash equilibria,
the computation of logit equilibria may be computationally hard depending on whether the chain mixes
rapidly (i.e., in time polynomial in the number of players) or not [3].
As the hardness of computing Nash equilibria justifies approximate notions of the concept [26, 10],
so Auletta et al. [5] look at an approximation of logit equilibria that they call metastable distributions.
These distributions aim to describe regularities arising during the transient phase of Markov chains be-
fore stationarity has been reached. Indeed, they are distributions that remain stable for a time which is
long enough for the observer rather than forever. Roughly speaking, the stability of the distributions in
this concept is measured in terms of the generations living some historical era, while stationary distri-
butions remain stable throughout all the generations. When the convergence to logit equilibria is too
slow, then there are generations which are outlived by the computation of the stationary distribution. For
these generations, metastable distributions1 grant an otherwise impossible descriptive power. (We refer
the interested reader to [5] for a complete overview of the rationale of metastability and for examples of
this concept.) Nevertheless, it is unclear whether and which strategic games enable the logit dynamics
to possess these distributions and if they are quickly reached.
The focus of this paper is the study of metastable distributions for the logit dynamics run on the class
of potential games [28]. Potential games are an important and widely studied class of games modeling
many strategic settings. Each such game satisfies a number of appealing properties, the existence of pure
Nash equilibria being one of them. A general study of metastability of potential games was left open
by [5] and assumes particular interest due to the known hardness results, see e.g. [17], which suggest
that the computation of pure Nash equilibria for them is an intractable problem, even for centralized
algorithms.
Our contribution. Our main result proves that every n-player potential game has a metastable distri-
bution for each starting profile of the logit dynamics, when the behavior of the logit dynamics on the
game is not chaotic in n. These distributions remain stable for a time which is super-polynomial in n,
if one is content with being within distance ε > 0 from the distributions. (The distance is defined in
1Observe that the concept of metastable distribution is defined for every Markov chain, not just for the logit dynamics.
However, the latter has been its main application.
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this context as the total variation distance, see below.) We also prove that the convergence rate to these
distributions, called pseudo-mixing time, is polynomial in n for values of β not too big when compared
to the (inverse of the) maximum difference in potential of neighboring profiles. Note that when β is very
high then logit dynamics is “close” to the best-response dynamics and therefore it is impossible to prove
in general quick convergence results for potential games due to the aforementioned hardness results. We
then give a picture which is as complete as possible. (To maintain n as our only parameter of interest,
we assume that the logarithm of the number of strategies available to players is upper bounded by a
polynomial in n; this assumption can, however, be relaxed to prove bounds asymptotic in n and in the
logarithm of the maximum number of strategies.)
We remark that our results are asymptotic in n, which imposes some requirement on the potential
games of interest to avoid a chaotic behavior (in n) of the logit dynamics run on a game; a wild behavior
of the Markov chain would not allow any meaningful asymptotic guarantee for a game.
To understand the kind of requirement that we need, it will be useful to liken our objective to the
following: we are given a graph algorithm and we are asked to find for which graphs the algorithm runs
in time polynomial in v, the number of nodes. Clearly, an answer to this question must consider not
a single graph, for which no asymptotic result makes sense, but a sequence of graphs indexed by the
number of nodes, as, for example, cliques, rings, stars, complete binary trees, and so on. Moreover, one
also requires that these sequences are well defined for infinitely many values of v. Indeed, if arbitrary
sequences of graphs were allowed, then it would be easy to adversarially build sequences that for in-
finitely many values of v use graphs for which the algorithm runs in polynomial time, whereas for other
infinitely many values of v they use graphs for which the algorithm requires exponential time. For this
sequence of graphs it is not possible to bound the running time with a polynomial, and thus we reach
the wrong conclusion that no graph exists for which the algorithm is polynomial. This explains why in
most of the literature about graph algorithms one focuses on a “well-defined” sequence of graphs (i.e.,
sequences of graphs for which the value of v does not alter the structure of the graph).
Here, the object of our analysis is the Markov chain modeling the evolution of the logit dynamics
for a given potential game. As for algorithms on graphs, in order to prove asymptotic results, we need to
take in account asymptotic well-defined sequences of these objects. Our definition considers (a sequence
of) potential games for which we can describe, for every n sufficiently large, the time needed to leave
a subset of profiles as either polynomial or super-polynomial. We call these games asymptotically well-
behaved. Generally speaking, this is the class of games for which the kind of asymptotic results we
are after are meaningful. Indeed, if we were unable to say if the dynamics leaves a subset of states in
polynomial or in super-polynomial time (e.g., if for infinitely many values of n we can describe this time
with a polynomial, and for infinitely many other values we need a super-polynomial to this aim) then,
depending on the (metastable) distribution of interest, we may be unable to prove asymptotic results
on the behavior of the dynamics starting from this subset of states. Our main result can be restated to
say that super-polynomial stability and polynomial convergence from every starting profile of the logit
dynamics holds for every potential game for which it makes sense to prove these asymptotic results.2
Moreover, we stress that similar assumptions are made in related literature on logit dynamics either
implicitly (as in [29, 3], where it is assumed that certain properties of the potential function do not change
as n changes), or explicitly, by considering specific games that clearly enjoy this property [5]. Moreover,
asymptotic results on the mixing time of Markov chains do require some assumption on the behavior of
the chain (technically, the minimum bottleneck ratio must either be a polynomial or a super-polynomial)
usually implicitly guaranteed by the definition of the chain at hand. Given that our objective is much
more complex than bounding the mixing time (i.e., measuring asymptotically the transient phase of the
chain – defined on a potential game – and ascertain stability of and convergence time to metastable
distributions) a similar, yet stronger, requirement ought to be used.
2In Appendix B we give a route to our definition, showing how less stringent definitions lead to ad-hoc n-player “chaotic”
potential games that do not admit metastable distributions with super-polynomially long stability and polynomial convergence.
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Our Technique. The proof of the above results consists of two main steps. We first devise, in Sec-
tion 3 a sufficient property for every Markov chain to have, for every starting state, a distribution that is
metastable for a large number of steps and reached quickly. The main idea behind this sufficient con-
dition is that when the dynamics starts from a subset from which it is “hard to leave” and in which it is
“easy to mix”, then the dynamics will stay for a long time close to the stationary distribution restricted
to that subset. Moreover, if a subset is “easy-to-leave,” then the dynamics will quickly reach a “hard-to-
leave” subset. The sufficient property, named partitioned Markov chain, intuitively consists a partition
of the states into subsets that are asymptotically “hard-to-leave & easy-to-mix” or “easy-to-leave”.
The second step amounts to showing that for every asymptotically well-behaved potential game the
logit dynamics admits such a partition. The proof of this result, given in Section 4, builds on a number of
technical contributions, some of which might be of independent interest. They mainly concern Markov
chains. The concepts of interest are mixing time (how long the chain takes to mix), bottleneck ratio
(intuitively, how hard it is for the stationary distribution to leave a subset of states), hitting time (how
long the chain takes to hit a certain subset of states) and spectral properties of the transition matrix of
Markov chains. In particular, we define a procedure which computes the required partition for these
games. We iteratively identify in the set of pure strategy profiles the “hard-to-leave” subsets. To prove
that these subsets are “easy-to-mix”, we firstly relate the pseudo-mixing time to the mixing time of
a certain family of restricted Markov chains. We then prove that the mixing time of these chains is
polynomial by using a spectral characterization of the transition matrix of restricted Markov chains.
Finally, the proof that the remaining profiles are “easy-to-leave” mainly relies on a connection between
bottleneck ratio and hitting time. Specifically, we prove both an upper bound and a lower bound on the
hitting time of a subset of states in terms of the bottleneck ratio of its complement.
The tool of partitioned Markov chains also allows us to simplify the proof of asymptotic metastability
for specific classes of games of interests. We exemplify this in Section 4.3 where we apply our results
to three specific games: the Curie-Weiss game, a Pigou-like congestion game and the opinion formation
game on complete bipartite graphs [18]. Incidentally, we essentially close an open problem of [5] about
metastability of the Curie-Weiss game. We remark that these games encompass all the classes of games
for which the behavior of logit dynamics has been studied in the literature.
While we introduce the tool of partitioned Markov chains to prove our main result, we believe
that it may be of independent interest in the analysis of the behavior of more general Markov chains. To
highlight this aspect of our work, we discuss in Section 5, a couple of problems, namely graph clustering
algorithms and exponential random network generation, that may benefit from the perspective and tools
of asymptotic metastability and partitioned Markov chains.
In appendix, we further complement the above contributions. We indeed prove additional spectral
results about the transition matrix of Markov chains defined by logit dynamics for a strategic (not nec-
essarily potential) game (cf. Section D). These results enhance our understanding of the dynamics and
pave the way to further advancements in the area.
Related works. Blume [7] introduced logit dynamics for modeling a noisy-rational behavior in game
dynamics. Early works about this dynamics have focused on its long-term behavior: Blume [7] showed
that, for 2× 2 coordination games and potential games, the long-term behavior of the system is concen-
trated around a specific Nash equilibrium; Alo`s-Ferrer and Netzer [1] gave a general characterization
of long-term behavior of logit dynamics for wider classes of games. Several works gave bounds on
the time that the dynamics takes to reach specific Nash equilibria of a game: Ellison [16] considered
graphical coordination games on cliques and rings; Peyton Young [33] and Montanari and Saberi [29]
extended this work to more general families of graphs. Different class of games have been considered
by Asadpour and Saberi [2] that focused on a class of congestion games, and by Ferraioli et al. [18] that
instead considered discrete preference games. Auletta et al. [4] were the first to propose the stationary
distribution of the logit dynamics Markov chain as a new equilibrium concept in game theory and to
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focus on the time the dynamics takes to get close to this equilibrium [3]. The logit response function has
also been used for defining another equilibrium concept, known as quantal response equilibrium [27].
This differs from the logit equilibrium since it is a product distribution (like Nash equilibrium).
In physics, chemistry, and biology, metastability is a phenomenon related to the evolution of systems
under noisy dynamics. In particular, metastability concerns moves between regions of the state spaces
and the existence of multiple, well separated time scales: at short time scales, the system appears to
be in a quasi-equilibrium, but really explores only a confined region of the available space state, while,
at larger time scales, it undergoes transitions between such different regions. Previous research about
metastability aims at expressing typical features of a metastable state and to evaluate the transition
time between metastable states. Several monographs on the subject are available in literature (see, for
example, [20, 31, 8, 21]). Auletta et al. [5] applied metastability to probability distributions, introducing
the concepts of metastable distribution and pseudo-mixing time and proving results for some specific
potential games.
Roughly speaking, metastability is a kind of approximation for stationarity. From this point of
view, metastable distributions may be likened to approximate equilibria. Two different approaches to
approximated equilibria have been proposed in literature. In the multiplicative version [10] a profile is
an approximate equilibrium as long as each player gains at least a factor (1−ε) of the payoff she gets by
playing any other strategy: these equilibria have been shown to be computationally hard both in general
[13] and for congestion games [36]. In the additive version [23], a profile is an approximate equilibrium
as long as each player gains at least the payoff she gains by playing any other strategy minus a small
additive factor ε > 0: for these equilibria a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme exists [26] but
it is impossible to have an FPTAS [9].
2 Preliminary definitions
A (discrete-time) Markov chainM = (S, P ) is a sequence of random variables {Xi : i ∈ N} such that
Xi ∈ S for every i ∈ N and P (Xi = y | Xi−1 = x) = Px (X1 = y) 3 = P (x,y) for every x,y ∈ S
and every i ∈ N. Here, S is the (finite) state space of the Markov chain, and P : S × S → [0, 1] is
its transition matrix. We will denote with P t the t-step transition matrix that describes the probability
P (Xi = y | Xi−t = x) of the state of the chain after t steps given the current state.
A Markov chain is irreducible if for every pair of states x,y ∈ S, there is t such that P t(x,y) > 0,
i.e., there is a chance to eventually reach y from every starting state. A Markov chain is aperiodic if for
every pair of states x,y ∈ S, the greatest common denominator of the t’s such that P t(x,y) > 0 is 1,
i.e., the chain can eventually visit y at any time and not only in a specific subset of times. A Markov
chain with finite state space is ergodic if it is irreducible and aperiodic. In particular, this implies that
there is t? such that P t
?
(x,y) > 0 for every x,y ∈ S. If a Markov chain is ergodic, then from
every initial state x the distribution P t(x, ·) over states of S will eventually converge to a stationary
distribution pi, such that piP = pi.
A Markov chain with transition matrix P and state space S is said to be reversible with respect to
a distribution pi if, for all x,y ∈ S, it holds that pi(x)P (x,y) = pi(y)P (y,x). If an ergodic chain
is reversible with respect to pi, then pi is its stationary distribution. Therefore when this happens, to
simplify our exposition we simply say that the matrix P is reversible.
Given a set of statesLwe letL and ∂L to denote, respectively, its complementary set, i.e., L = S\L,
and the border of L, that is the set of profiles in L with at least a neighbor in L. Moreover, we say that
a set L is connected if, for every x,y ∈ L, there are x0,x1, . . . ,xk ∈ L with x0 = x, xk = y and
P (xi−1,xi) > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , k.
3Throughout this work, we denote with Px (·) the probability of an event conditioned on the starting state of the Markov
chain being x.
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2.1 Convergence of Markov chains
Mixing time. Arguably, the principal notion to measure the rate of convergence of a Markov chain to
its stationary distribution is the mixing time, which is defined as follows. Let us set
d(t) = max
x∈S
∥∥P t(x, ·)− pi∥∥
TV
,
where the total variation distance ‖µ− ν‖TV between two probability distributions µ and ν on the same
state space S is defined as
‖µ− ν‖TV = max
A⊂S
|µ(A)− ν(A)| = 1
2
∑
x∈S
|µ(x)− ν(x)|,
where µ(A) =
∑
x∈A µ(x) and ν(A) =
∑
x∈A ν(x). For 0 < ε < 1/2, the mixing time of the logit
dynamics is defined as
tmix(ε) = min{t ∈ N : d(t) ≤ ε}.
It is usual to set ε = 1/4 or ε = 1/2e. We write tmix to mean tmix(1/4) and we refer generically to
“mixing time” when the actual value of ε is immaterial. Observe that tmix(ε) ≤
⌈
log2 ε
−1⌉ tmix.
Relaxation time. Another important measure of convergence for Markov chains is given by the relax-
ation time. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with finite state space S; let us label the
eigenvalues of P in non-increasing order
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ|S|.
It is well-known (see, for example, Lemma 12.1 in [25]) that λ1 = 1 and, if P is ergodic, then λ2 < 1
and λ|S| > −1. We set λ? as the largest eigenvalue in absolute value other than λ1, i.e.,
λ? = max
i=2,...,|S|
{|λi|} .
The relaxation time trel of a Markov chainM is defined as
trel =
1
1− λ? .
The relaxation time is related to the mixing time by the following theorem (see, for example, Theorems
12.3 and 12.4 in [25]).
Theorem 2.1. Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic and reversible Markov chain with state space
S and stationary distribution pi. Then
(trel − 1) log 2 ≤ tmix ≤ log
(
4
pimin
)
trel,
where pimin = minx∈S pi(x).
Hitting time. In some cases, we are interested in bounding the first time that the chain hits a profile
in a certain set of states, also known as its hitting time. Formally, for a set L ⊆ S, we denote by τL the
random variable denoting the hitting time of L. Note that the hitting time, differently from mixing and
relaxation time, depends on where the dynamics starts.
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Bottleneck ratio. Quite central in our study is the concept of bottleneck ratio. Consider an ergodic
Markov chain with finite state space S, transition matrix P , and stationary distribution pi. The probability
distribution Q(x,y) = pi(x)P (x,y) is of particular interest and is sometimes called the edge stationary
distribution. Note that if the chain is reversible then Q(x,y) = Q(y,x). For every L ⊆ S, L 6= ∅, we
let Q(L, S \ L) = ∑x∈L,y∈S\LQ(x,y). Then the bottleneck ratio of L is
B(L) =
Q(L, S \ L)
pi(L)
.
We use the following theorem to derive lower bounds to the mixing time (see, for example, Theorem 7.3
in [25]).
Theorem 2.2. LetM = {Xt : t ∈ N} be an ergodic Markov chain with state space S, transition matrix
P , and stationary distribution pi. Let L ⊆ S be any set with pi(L) ≤ 1/2. Then the mixing time is
tmix ≥ 1
4B(L)
.
The bottleneck ratio is also strictly related to the relaxation time. Indeed, let
B? = min
L : pi(R)≤1/2
B(L).
Then the following theorem holds (see, for example, Theorem 13.14 in [25]).
Theorem 2.3. Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic and reversible Markov chain with state space
S. Let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue of P . Then
B2?
2
≤ 1− λ2 ≤ 2B?.
2.2 Metastability
In this section we give formal definitions of metastable distributions and pseudo-mixing time. We also
survey some of the tools used for our results. For a more detailed description we refer the reader to [5].
Definition 2.1. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S. A probability
distribution µ over S is (ε, T )-metastable, with ε > 0 and T ∈ N, for P if for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T it holds
that ∥∥µP t − µ∥∥
TV
≤ ε.
The definition of metastable distribution captures the idea of a distribution that behaves approxi-
mately like the stationary distribution: if we start from such a distribution and run the chain we stay
close to it for a “long” time. Some interesting properties of metastable distributions are discussed in [5],
including the following lemmata, that turn out to be useful for proving our results.
Lemma 2.1 ([5]). Let P be a Markov chain with finite state space S and stationary distribution pi. For
a subset of states L ⊆ S let piL be the stationary distribution conditioned on L, i.e.
piL(x) =
{
pi(x)/pi(L), if x ∈ L;
0, otherwise.
(1)
Then, piL is (B(L), 1)-metastable.
Lemma 2.2 ([5]). If µ is (ε, 1)-metastable for P then µ is (εT , T )-metastable for P .
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Among all metastable distributions, we are interested in the ones that are quickly reached from a
(possibly large) set of states. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.2. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S, let L ⊆ S be a
non-empty set of states and let µ be a probability distribution over S. We define the pseudo-mixing time
tLµ(ε) as
tLµ(ε) = inf{t ∈ N :
∥∥P t(x, ·)− µ∥∥
TV
≤ ε for all x ∈ L}.
Since the stationary distribution pi of an ergodic Markov chain is reached within ε in time tmix(ε)
from every state, according to Definition 2.2 we have that tSpi(ε) = tmix(ε). The following simple lemma
connects metastability and pseudo-mixing time.
Lemma 2.3 ([5]). Let µ be a (ε1, T )-metastable distribution and let L ⊆ S be a set of states such that
tLµ(ε2) is finite. Then for every x ∈ L it holds that
∥∥P t(x, ·)− µ∥∥
TV
≤ ε1 + ε2 for every tLµ(ε2) ≤ t ≤
tLµ(ε2) + T .
2.3 Asymptotic Metastability
The notions and results about metastability and pseudo-mixing time introduced above apply to a sin-
gle Markov chain. Auletta et al. [5] adopted these notions to evaluate the asymptotic behavior of a
parametrized class of Markov chains, where the parameter n is the logarithm of the number of states.
Specifically, they consider a sequence M of n-chains, Mn being the unique Markov chain in the se-
quence with a number of states whose logarithm is n, and they analyze the asymptotic properties of
these Markov chains. Since we do not have a single Markov chain but a sequence of them, one for
each n, we need to consider an asymptotic counterpart of the notions above. Auletta et al. [5], in fact,
showed that the special Markov chains defined in their work enjoys the following property, that we name
asymptotic metastability.
Definition 2.3. Let M be a sequence of n-chains. Let C be a class of functions in n closed under
multiplication4. We say that M is asymptotically metastable for C if for every ε > 0 there are functions
p = pε ∈ C and q = qε /∈ C such that for each n sufficiently large, the Markov chainMn converges in
time at most p(n) from each starting state to a (ε, q(n))-metastable distribution.
In other words, for each starting state the Markov chain “quickly” converges to a distribution that
remains metastable for an amount of time that is “much larger” than the time one takes to reach it, where
“quickly” and “much larger” are asymptotically measured on the number of states.
3 Partitioned Markov Chains Are Asymptotically Metastable
We next give a sufficient property for every ergodic Markov chain to be asymptotically metastable.
Specifically, in this section we will introduce the concept of partitioned Markov chain. Then, we prove
that partitioned Markov chain are asymptotically metastable.
Note that we will next focus only on ergodic Markov chains whose mixing time is not in the class
C, otherwise the stationary distribution enjoys the desired properties of stability and convergence.
4Clearly, different definitions ofC give rise to more or less interesting distributions, depending on the application of interest.
We will mainly use C to divide polynomials from superpolynomials, except for some of the applications outside game theory
in Section 5 where C will be defined to separate logarithmic functions from superlogarithmic ones.
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3.1 Partitioned Markov Chains
Let M be a sequence of n-chains. Let P be the transition matrix ofMn, for some n > 0, and let pi be
the corresponding stationary distribution. For non-empty L ⊆ S, we define a Markov chain with state
space L and transition matrix P˚L defined as follows.
P˚L(x,y) =
P (x,y) if x 6= y;1−∑z∈L,
z 6=x
P (x, z) = P (x,x) +
∑
z∈S\L P (x, z) otherwise.
(2)
It easy to check that the stationary distribution of this Markov chain is given by the distribution piL(x) =
pi(x)
pi(L) , for every x ∈ L. Note also that the Markov chain defined upon P˚L is aperiodic, since the Markov
chain defined upon P is, and it will be irreducible if L is a connected set. For a fixed ε > 0, we will
denote with tLmix(ε) the mixing time of the chain described in (2). We also denote with BL(A) the
bottleneck ratio of A ⊂ L in the Markov chain with state space L and transition matrix P˚L.
We are now ready to introduce the definition of partitioned Markov chain.
Definition 3.1. LetM be a sequence of n-chains. We say thatM is partitioned for a classC of functions
closed under multiplication if for every ε > 0 there is p = pε ∈ C and q = qε /∈ C such that for each
n there is a family of connected subsets R1, . . . , Rk of the state space S of Mn, with k ≥ 1, and a
partition T1, . . . , Tk, N of S, with Ti ⊆ Ri for every i = 1, . . . , k, such that
1. the bottleneck ratio of Ri is at most 1/q(n), for every i = 1, . . . , k;
2. the mixing time tRimix(ε) is at most p(n), for every i = 1, . . . , k;
3. for every i = 1, . . . , k and for every x ∈ Ti, it holds that
Px
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε;
4. for every x ∈ N , it holds that
Px
(
τ⋃
i Ti
≤ p(n)) ≥ 1− ε.
Note that we allow in the above definition that Ti, for some i = 1, . . . , k, or N are empty. Linking
back to the intuition discussed in the introduction, R1, . . . , Rk represent the “easy-to-mix” subsets of
states (condition 2); these sets play a crucial role in defining distributions that are metastable for very
long time (condition 1). However, when the Markov chain starts close to the boundary of some Ri, it is
likely to leaveRi quickly. Since we are interested in “easy-to-mix & hard-to-leave” subsets of states, for
each Ri we identify its core Ti as the set of states from which the Markov chain takes long time to leave
Ri (condition 3). The distinction between core and non-core states will help in proving that metastable
distributions are quickly reached from every starting state.
The main result of this section proves that a partitioned Markov chain is asymptotically metastable.
Theorem 3.1. Let M be a sequence of n-chains. If M is partitioned for C, then M is asymptotically
metastable for C.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
A high level idea of the proof is discussed next. We initially need to define the metastable distributions to
which the Markov chain converges. To describe the distributions of interest, we leverage known results
connecting bottleneck ratio and metastability. In particular, it turns out that the stationary distribution of
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the chain restricted to of a subset of states with bottleneck ratio at most the inverse of a super-polynomial,
as defined in (1), is metastable for a super-polynomial amount of time (Lemma 2.1). In this way we can
easily “build” metastable distributions from the sets Ri given by the definition of partitioned chain (cf.
Proposition 3.1).
What about the pseudo-mixing time of this distribution? We distinguish two cases. First we consider
states that are in the “core” of the support of this distribution, namely the sets Ti given by the definition
of partitioned chain. We show that the pseudo-mixing time from these states is related to the mixing
time of the chain restricted to Ri as described in (2) (see Corollary 3.1). Then, being the mixing time of
the chains restricted to Ri polynomial by construction, it follows that the pseudo-mixing time from the
core is polynomial.
What about out-of-core states? Suppose that there is a state from which the chain takes long time to
converge to a metastable distribution. Then it must be the case that the chain takes long time to hit the
core of one such distribution with high probability. However, this cannot be the case since, by definition,
the partitioned chain from every non-core state quickly hits a state in the core of some distribution.
Next we formally prove Theorem 3.1. In particular, the proof follows from the Propositions 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 given below that, respectively, describe the metastable distributions, bound the pseudo-mixing
time from the core, and evaluate the behavior of the Markov chain when starting from non-core states.
Identifying the metastable distributions. We start by proving that some distributions defined on the
sets Ri are metastable for long time.
Proposition 3.1. Let M be a sequence of n-chains. If M is partitioned for C, then for every ε > 0
there exists a function T = Tε /∈ C such that for each5 i and each n, the distribution µi that sets
µi(x) = pi(x)/pi(Ri), where pi is the stationary distribution ofMn, is (ε, T (n))-metastable.
Proof. Fix i. Given ε > 0, consider the function T = Tε such that T (n) = εB(Ri) ≥ εq(n), where Ri is
the support of µi. By the definition of q, T /∈ C.
By Lemma 2.1, µi is (B(Ri), 1)-metastable. By Lemma 2.2, µi is also (B(Ri) · T (n), T (n))-
metastable. The lemma follows since B(Ri) · T (n) = ε.
Finally, the following lemma shows that a combination of metastable distributions is metastable.
Lemma 3.1. Let P the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let µi be a distribution
(εi, Ti)-metastable for P , for i = 1, 2, . . .. Set ε = maxi εi and T = mini{Ti}. Then, the distribution
µ =
∑
i αiµi, with
∑
i αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0, is (ε, T )-metastable.
Proof. For every t ≤ T we have∥∥µP t − µ∥∥
TV
= max
A⊆S
∣∣(µP t)(A)− µ(A)∣∣
= max
A⊆S
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
αi
(
(µiP
t)(A)− µi(A)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
αi max
A⊆S
∣∣(µiP t)(A)− µi(A)∣∣ ≤ ε.
5There may be values of n for which the partition uses less than i “components” and thusRi, Ti and µi are not well defined.
However, asymptotic bounds on the metastability and the pseudo-mixing time of µi are well defined as long as there are infinite
values of n for which Ri is given. Moreover, since every partition contains at least one “component” for every input, we have
that there exists n0 such that for every i ≤ maxn≥n0 k(n), Ri is defined infinite times.
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Pseudo-mixing time from the core. Now we prove that the a partitioned Markov chain converges
quickly to the metastable distribution µi defined above, whenever the starting point is selected from the
core Ti of this distribution. Specifically, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let M be a sequence of n-chains and fix ε > 0. If M is partitioned for C, then
there is a function p? ∈ C such that for each i and each n, the pseudo-mixing time of µi from Ti is
tTiµi(2ε) = O(p?(n)).
In order to prove Proposition 3.2, consider the Markov chain defined in (2). Let us abuse the notation
and denote with P˚L and piL also the Markov chain and the distribution defined on the entire state space
S, with P˚L(x,y) = 0 if x /∈ L or y /∈ L, and similarly piL(x) = 0 when x /∈ L.
Recall that ∂L is the border of L, that is the set of profiles in L with at least a neighbor in S \ L.
Recall that τS\L is the random variable denoting the first time the Markov chain with transition matrix
P hits a state x ∈ S \ L. The following lemma formally proves the intuitive fact that, by starting from
a state in L the chain P and the chain P˚L are the same up to the time in which the former chain hits a
state in S \ L. The proof uses the well-known coupling technique (cf., e.g., [25]) which is summarized
in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 3.2. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let P˚L be the
restriction of P to L ⊆ S, L 6= ∅, as given in (2). Then, for every x ∈ L and for every t > 0,∥∥∥P t(x, ·)− P˚ tL(x, ·)∥∥∥
TV
≤ Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
Proof. Consider the following coupling (Xt, Yt)t>0 of the Markov chains with transition matrix P and
P˚L, respectively:
• If Xi = Yi ∈ L \ ∂L, then we update the first chain according to P and obtain Xi+1; we then set
Yi+1 = Xi+1;
• If Xi = Yi ∈ ∂L, then we update the first chain according to P : if Xi+1 ∈ L, then we set
Yi+1 = Xi+1, otherwise we set Yi+1 = Yi;
• If Xi 6= Yi, then we update the chains independently.
Since X0 = Y0 = x ∈ L, we have that Xt 6= Yt only if τS\L ≤ t. Thus, by the properties of couplings
(see Theorem A.1), we have∥∥∥P t(x, ·)− P˚ tL(x, ·)∥∥∥
TV
≤ Px (Xt 6= Yt) ≤ Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
The following corollary follows from the Lemma 3.2 and the triangle inequality property of the total
variation distance.
Corollary 3.1. Let P the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let P˚L be the
restriction of P to a non-empty L ⊆ S as given in (2). Then, for every x ∈ L and for every t > 0,∥∥P t(x, ·)− piL∥∥TV ≤ ∥∥∥P˚ tL(x, ·)− piL∥∥∥TV +Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
Using Corollary 3.1 we can prove Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Fix n. For each x ∈ Ti, by Corollary 3.1 and sincePx
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε,
we obtain ∥∥∥P tRimix(ε)(x, ·)− µi∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε+ ε.
The lemma follows from the observation that tRimix(ε) ∈ C by definition of partitioned Markov chain.
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Pseudo-mixing time starting from the remaining profiles. Consider the distributions µi defined
above (i.e., the stationary distribution restricted to Ri). We focus here on the convergence time to
distributions of the form
ν(y) =
∑
i
αiµi(y),
for αi ≥ 0 and
∑
i αi = 1. Specifically, for every state x ∈ N , we define the distribution
νx(y) =
∑
i
µi(y) ·Px
(
XτS\N ∈ Ti | τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)
)
, (3)
where T εS\N (x) is the first time step t in which Px (τS\L > t) ≤ ε. Observe that by definition of
τS\N , since the Ti’s and N are a partition of S, XτS\N ∈ ∪iTi is a certain event for all values of τS\N .
Moreover, by the definition of T εS\N (x), the event τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x) has non-zero probability and thus
we can condition on it. Thus,
∑
iPx
(
XτS\N ∈ Ti | τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)
)
= 1. The above is then a valid
definition of the αi’s.
Then, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let M be a sequence of n-chains and fix ε > 0. If M is partitioned for C, then there
is a function T = Tε /∈ C and a function p? ∈ C such that, for every n and for each x ∈ N the
corresponding distribution νx is (ε, T (n))-metastable and the pseudo-mixing time of νx from the state
x is t{x}νx (4ε) = O(p?(n)).
Proof. Fix n. Notice that, the distribution νx is a convex combination of distributions that are metastable
for time Ti /∈ C: thus, from Lemma 3.1, there exist a function T ∈ C such that each such νx is
(ε, T (n))-metastable.
Moreover, from the definition of partitioned chain, we have that T εS\N (x) ≤ ρ?(n) ∈ C for every
x ∈ N . Consider then the function p?(·) such that p?(n) = ρ?(n)+maxi tTiµi(2ε). From Proposition 3.2
and the closure properties of C, it turns out that p?(·) ∈ C. We complete the proof by showing that, for
every sufficiently large n and every x ∈ N , p?(n) upper bounds the pseudo-mixing time t{x}νx (4ε) to νx
from the state x.
We set t? = p?(n), and denote with E the event “τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)” and with E its complement.
Moreover, we will use τ? as a shorthand for τS\N .
Recall that Xt denotes the state of the Markov chain at step t and observe that∥∥∥P t?(x, ·)− νx∥∥∥
TV
= max
A⊂S
|Px (Xt? ∈ A)− νx(A)|
= max
A⊂S
∣∣Px (Xt? ∈ A ∧ E)− νx(A) +Px (Xt? ∈ A ∧ E)∣∣
= max
A⊂S
∣∣Px (Xt? ∈ A | E) (1−Px (E))− νx(A) +Px (Xt? ∈ A | E)Px (E)∣∣
≤ max
A⊂S
|Px (Xt? ∈ A | E)− νx(A)|+Px
(
E
)
≤ ‖Px (Xt? | E)− νx‖TV + ε,
where the definition of T εS\N (x) implies that Px (E) ≥ 1− ε > 0 and then yields the third equality and
last inequality. The penultimate inequality, instead, simply follows from the subadditivity of the absolute
value and the fact that the difference between two probabilities is upper bounded by 1. As every µi is
metastable for time Ti /∈ C, we have
‖Px (Xt? | E)− νx‖TV =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E) ·Px (Xt? | Xτ? = y ∧ E)− νx
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
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≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E)
(
P t
?−τ?(y, ·)− µi
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E)
∥∥∥P t?−τ?(y, ·)− µi∥∥∥
TV
≤ 3ε,
where the definition of τ? yields Xτ? ∈ Ti, for some i, which in turns yields the first equality by the law
of total probability. In the first inequality above, instead, we use the definition of νx and the fact that by
definition of t?, E implies t? − τ? ≥ t? − T εS\N (x) ≥ maxi tTiµi(2ε) ≥ 0; the second inequality follows
from the subadditivity of the total variation distance; and the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.3
(note that t? − τ? satisfies the hypothesis of the lemma: the lower bound is showed above, while the
upper bound follows from the fact that the µi’s are metastable for a time Ti /∈ C). Hence, we have for
every sufficiently large n and every x ∈ N , t{x}νx (4ε) ≤ t? = p?(n).
4 Logit Dynamics for Potential Games is Asymptotically Metastable
In Section 3 we characterized the (sequences of) Markov chains for which one can prove asymptotic
metastability. Here we focus on the specific setting within which metastability of Markov chains has
been defined, namely the behavior of the logit dynamics for potential games. We will use the previous
characterization to prove that for every potential game and for every starting profile of the game the
logit dynamics converges in polynomial time to a distribution that is metastable for a superpolynomial
number of steps.
We begin by formally introducing the concepts of potentiality games and logit dynamics.
4.1 Definitions
Potential Games. A strategic game G is a triple ([n], (S1, . . . , Sn),U), where [n] = {1, . . . , n} is a
finite set of players, (S1, . . . , Sn) is a family of non-empty finite sets (Si is the set of strategies available
to player i), and U = (u1, . . . , un) is a family of utility functions (or payoffs), where ui : S → R,
S = S1 × . . . × Sn being the set of all strategy profiles, is the utility function of player i. We focus on
(exact) potential games, i.e., games for which there exists a function Φ: S → R such that for every pair
of x,y ∈ S, with y = (x−i, yi), we have:
Φ(x)− Φ(y) = ui(y)− ui(x). 6
Note that we use the standard game theoretic notation (x−i, s) to mean the vector obtained from x by
replacing the i-th entry with s; i.e. (x−i, s) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, s, xi+1, . . . , xn). A strategy profile x is
a Nash equilibrium7 if, for all i, ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, si), for all si ∈ Si. It is fairly easy to see that local
minima of the potential function correspond to the Nash equilibria of the game.
For two vectors x,y, we denote with H(x,y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}| the Hamming distance between
x and y. For every x ∈ S, N(x) = {y ∈ S : H(x,y) = 1} denotes the set of neighbors of x and
Ni(x) = {y ∈ N(x) : y−i = x−i} is the set of those neighbors that differ exactly in the i-th coordinate.
Logit dynamics. The logit dynamics has been introduced in [7] and runs as follows: at every time step
(i) Select one player i ∈ [n] uniformly at random; (ii) Update the strategy of player i according to the
6Note that this definition is slightly different from the standard one by Monderer and Shapley [28], in which it is required
that Φ(x) − Φ(y) = ui(x) − ui(y). However, it is immediate to see that the two definitions are equivalent. Our definition
has been chosen because it helps drawing the connection between logit dynamics and similar concepts in Physics.
7In this paper, we only focus on pure Nash equilibria. We avoid explicitly mentioning it throughout.
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Boltzmann distribution with parameter β over the set Si of her strategies. That is, a strategy si ∈ Si will
be selected with probability
σi(si | x−i) = 1
Zi(x−i)
eβui(x−i,si), (4)
where x−i denotes the profile of strategies played at the current time step by players different from i,
Zi(x−i) =
∑
zi∈Si e
βui(x−i,zi) is the normalizing factor, and β ≥ 0. One can see parameter β as the
inverse of the noise or, equivalently, the rationality level of the system: indeed, from (4), it is easy
to see that for β = 0 player i selects her strategy uniformly at random, for β > 0 the probability is
biased toward strategies promising higher payoffs, and for β that goes to infinity player i chooses her
best response strategy (if more than one best response is available, she chooses one of them uniformly
at random).
The above dynamics defines a Markov chain {Xt}t∈N with the set of strategy profiles as state space,
and where the transition probability P (x,y) from profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) to profile y = (y1, . . . , yn)
is zero ifH(x,y) ≥ 2 and it is 1nσi(yi | x−i) if the two profiles differ exactly at player i. More formally,
we can define the logit dynamics as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let G = ([n], (S1, . . . , Sn),U) be a strategic game and let β ≥ 0. The logit dynamics
for G is the Markov chainMβ = (S, P ) where S = S1 × · · · × Sn and
P (x,y) =
1
n
·

σi(yi | x−i), if y−i = x−i and yi 6= xi;
n∑
i=1
σi(yi | x−i), if y = x;
0, otherwise;
(5)
where σi(yi | x−i) is defined in (4).
The Markov chain defined by (5) is ergodic [7]. Hence, the logit dynamics will eventually converge
to a stationary distribution pi, such that piP = pi. As in [4], we call the stationary distribution pi of the
Markov chain defined by the logit dynamics on a game G, the logit equilibrium of G.
For the class of potential games the stationary distribution of the logit dynamics is the well-known
Gibbs measure.
Theorem 4.1 ([7]). If G = ([n], (S1, . . . , Sn),U) is a potential game with potential function Φ, then
the Markov chain given by (5) is reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure pi(x) = 1Z e
−βΦ(x), where
Z =
∑
y∈S e
−βΦ(y) is the normalizing constant.
It is worthwhile to notice that logit dynamics for potential games and Glauber dynamics for Gibbs
distributions are two ways of looking at the same Markov chain (see [7] for details). This, in particular,
implies that we can write
σi(si | x−i) = e
−βΦ(x−i,si)∑
z∈Si e
−βΦ(x−i,z) .
4.2 All Asymptotically Well-Defined Potential Games Are Asymptotically Metastable
Here, we are interested in showing that mestastable distributions are reached in polynomial time and
remain stable for a superpolynomial number of steps. In other words, we assume that the class C of
functions for which we will prove asymptotic metastability of the Markov chains describing the logit
dynamics consists of the class of all functions that are at most polynomial. Since C is well-understood
in this setting, we will omit it in the rest of this section. Moreover, when the logit dynamics for a
game is (not) asymptotically metastable, we say for brevity that the game itself is (not) asymptotically
metastable. Similarly, when the Markov chains describing the logit dynamics run on a game is (not)
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partitioned, we will say for brevity that the game is (not) partitioned by the logit dynamics or that the
logit dynamics is (not) partitioned.
Before our analysis, we need to highlight some assumptions that we make henceforth. First, bounds
on the convergence of the logit dynamics are usually measured on the number of players of the game
on which the dynamics is run. This is in contrast with the previous section, where we discussed that
convergence of Markov chains are instead measured in the logarithm of the number of states. To address
this issue, we will assume that the logarithm of the maximal number of strategies available to a player is
at most a polynomial in n. Specifically, given a sequence of n-player games G, one for each number n
of players, we denote asm(·) the function such thatm(n) is the maximum number of strategies available
to a player in Gn, where Gn is the game in the sequence G with exactly n-players. Then, we will assume
that the function logm(·) is at most polynomial in its input. We can easily drop this assumption by
asking for results that are asymptotic in log |S|, where |S| denotes the function returning the number of
profiles of the game: each one of our proofs can be rewritten according to this requirement with very
small changes. Note that since |S| for a game with n players is at most m(n)n, this requirement is
equivalent to asking for results asymptotic in n and in the logarithm of the function m.
Note also that we focus only on n-player games and values of β such that the mixing time of the logit
dynamics is at least super-polynomial in n, otherwise, as indicated above, the stationary distribution
enjoys the desired properties of stability and convergence. Throughout the rest of the paper we will
denote with β0 the smallest value of β such that the mixing time is not polynomial.
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, we are aiming to give results asymptotic in the number n
of players about the behavior of logit dynamics run on potential games. Clearly, it makes sense to give
asymptotic results about the property of an object, only if this property is asymptotically well-defined,
that is, the object is uniquely defined for infinitely many values of the parameter according to which we
compute the asymptotic and the property of this object does not depend “chaotically” on this parameter.
Here the object of interest are games (specifically, potential games) and the property of interest is the
behavior of the logit dynamics for these games and a given rationality level β. Thus, in our setting,
it makes sense to give asymptotic results only when a potential game is uniquely defined for infinitely
many n and the behavior of the logit dynamics for this potential game and a given β is not chaotic as n
increases. We call these games asymptotically well-behaved for the given β. Specifically, we have the
following definition.
Definition 4.2. A sequenceG of n-player potential games is asymptotically well-behaved for β, if there
is n0, a polynomial p and a super-polynomial q such that for every n ≥ n0 and for every L ⊆ Sn,
either B(L) ≥ 1p(n) or B(L) ≤ 1q(n) , with B(L) being the bottleneck ratio of L in the the Markov
chain defined by the logit dynamics for game G and rationality level β. Henceforth, we will say that the
functions p, q are generated by the sequence of games G.
Intuitively, these are the only games for which it makes sense to give asymptotic results, since if there
is a subset of profiles for which the bottleneck ratio is neither at least the inverse of a polynomial nor at
most the inverse of a super-polynomial, then, as we formally prove below in Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, we
cannot say if this subset is “easy-to-leave” or “hard-to-leave”. Hence, depending on the distribution of
interest, no asymptotic result can be given when the dynamics starts from these profiles.8 In Appendix B,
8It turns out that for the metastable distributions we identify in Proposition 3.1 we might be able to give asymptotic results
even when not all the sets of profiles have their bottleneck ratio classified as either polynomial or super-polynomial. The
intuition is the following: consider a large subset L, not classified, of a subset A classified as “hard-to-leave”. The stationary
distribution restricted toAmight give a large weight to the profiles in L and therefore the unknown behavior of Lmight not be
an obstacle to proving that in A it is “easy-to-mix”. Thus we can asymptotically describe the behavior of the logit dynamics
starting from L, even if we do not know how easy it is to leave L. We show in Appendix C that there are simple games that are
asymptotically metastable, but that are not captured by Definition 4.2, and give a technical definition to describe these games.
Nevertheless, we see this more as a technical nuisance than a conceptual contribution. We therefore prefer to keep our focus
on the clean, simple and intuitive definition of asymptotically well-behaved games.
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we indeed show several examples of these “bad” games for which asymptotic results about metastability
do not make sense, and that our definition must necessarily rule out. We also show how these examples
guide us to Definition 4.2.
We are now ready to formally state the main result of this section, namely that every asymptotically
well-behaved potential game is asymptotic metastable. More specifically, we will prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2. LetG be a sequence of n-player potential games and let ∆ be the function that, for every
n, gives the Lipschitz constant of the potential function Φn of Gn, i.e.,
∆(n) := max {Φn(x)− Φn(y) : H(x,y) = 1} .
Then, for every function ρ at most polynomial, if G is asymptotically well-behaved for β0 ≤ β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) ,
then it is asymptotically metastable for β.
The dependence on ∆(n) is a by-product of the fact that the logit dynamics is not invariant to scaling
of the utility function, i.e., scaling the utility function of a certain factor requires to inversely scale β
to get the same logit dynamics (see [4] for a discussion). In a sense, β∆(n) is the natural parameter
that describes the logit dynamics. Then, from this point of view, the requirement on β in the above
theorem becomes almost natural: we, indeed, require that β∆(n) is sufficiently large in order for the
mixing time to be not polynomial, but we also require that β∆(n) is a polynomial. This assumption is in
general necessary because when β∆(n) is high enough logit dynamics roughly behaves as best-response
dynamics. Moreover, in this case, the only metastable distributions have to be concentrated around the
set of Nash equilibria. This is because for β∆(n) very high, it is extremely unlikely that a player leaves
a Nash equilibrium. Then, the hardness results about the convergence of best-response dynamics for
potential games, cf. e.g. [17], imply that the convergence to metastable distributions for high β∆(n) is
similarly computationally hard.
The proof builds upon Theorem 3.1 and proves that the Markov chain corresponding to the logit
dynamics for an asymptotically well-behaved potential game is partitioned, whenever β is as in the
statement.
4.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In order to prove Theorem 4.2, we introduce a (computationally infeasible) algorithm that, given a
sequence of n-player games G and n, computes subsets R1, . . . , Rk of the set S of profiles of Gn
and a partition T1, . . . , Tk, N of S. Next we show that under the condition that the potential game is
asymptotically well-behaved, the sets returned by this algorithm enjoy the properties required by the
definition of partitioned Markov chain. The procedure works its way by finding subsets of profiles
that act as super-polynomial bottlenecks for the Markov chain. The algorithm Ap,q takes in input an
asymptotically well-behaved sequence of n-player potential games G, a rationality level β, a constant
ε > 0 and n; it is parametrized by two functions p and q generated by G.
Algorithm 4.1 (Ap,q). Set N = S and i = 1. While there is a set L ⊆ N with pi(L) ≤ 1/2 such that
B(L) ≤ 1/q(n), do:
1. Denote with Ri one such subset with the smallest stationary probability;
2. Denote with Ti the largest subset of Ri such that for every y ∈ Ti,
Py
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε;
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3. If Ti is not empty, return Ri and Ti, delete from N all profiles contained in Ti and increase i.
Otherwise, terminate the algorithm.
Observe that if there is a disconnected set L such that B(L) ≤ 1/q(n), then each connected compo-
nent L′ of L will have B(L′) ≤ 1/q(n) and smaller stationary probability: hence, the set Ri returned by
the algorithm will be connected. Note also that by Theorem 2.2 and the assumption that we are consid-
ering only cases in which the mixing time is super-polynomial, the algorithm above enters at least once
in the loop (and thus at least a subset Ri is computed).
Clearly the sets Ri returned by the algorithm enjoy the property of having super-polynomial bottle-
neck ratio and the sets Ti satisfy the requirement that, starting from any x ∈ Ti, it is unlikely to leave
Ri quickly. It is then left to prove that the mixing time of the chains restricted to Ri is polynomial and
that it is easy to leave the set N . This follows from the following propositions that are proved in the next
sections.
Proposition 4.1. Let β0 ≤ β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) , with ρ at most polynomial in its input. Let G be a sequence of
n-player potential games asymptotically well-behaved for β. Let p, q be the functions generated by G.
Consider the sequence of sets Ri returned byAp,q. Then, for every ε > 0, tRimix(ε) is at most polynomial.
Proposition 4.2. Let β0 ≤ β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) , with ρ at most polynomial in its input. Let G be a sequence of
n-player potential games asymptotically well-behaved for β. Let p, q be the functions generated by G.
Consider the set N returned by Ap,q. Then, for every ε > 0, T εS\N (x) is at most polynomial, where, for
x ∈ N , T εS\N (x) is defined as the first time step t in which Px (τS\N > t) ≤ ε.
This proves that asymptotically well-behaved potential games are partitioned by the logit dynamics
and, hence, they are asymptotically metastable, concluding the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
A high level idea of the proof of Proposition 4.1 is discussed next. We first give a spectral character-
ization of the transition matrix defined in (2) (Lemma 4.2). Then we show that no subset of Ri has
small bottleneck ratio in the restricted chain (Lemma 4.3). Note that this does not directly follow from
Ri being the smallest subset with super-polynomial bottleneck ratio. Indeed, the bottleneck ratio of a
subset depends on the dynamics according to which it is computed. Thus, a subset can have a small
bottleneck ratio when computed within the reference frame of the restricted dynamics, but not when we
refer to the original dynamics. Nevertheless, we show that this is not the case. Specifically, we will
show that for asymptotically well-behaved games there is a relationship between the bottleneck ratio of
a subset of profiles in the restricted and in the original dynamics. Finally, the result follows from the
known relationship among mixing time, relaxation time and bottleneck ratio (see Theorems 2.1 and 2.3).
Spectral property of logit dynamics restrictions
In [3] it has been shown that all the eigenvalues of the transition matrix of logit dynamics for potential
games are non-negative. The technique used in that proof can be generalized to work also for some
restrictions of these matrices.
To begin, we note that the definition of reversibility can be extended in a natural way to every square
matrix and probability distribution over the set of rows of the matrix. We then state a fairly standard
result relating eigenvalues of matrices to certain inner products.
Lemma 4.1. Let P be a square matrix on state space S and pi be a probability distribution on S. If P is
reversible with respect to pi and has no negative eigenvalues then for every function f : S → R we have
〈Pf, f〉pi :=
∑
x∈S
pi(x)(Pf)(x)f(x) ≥ 0.
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Proof. Let λ1, . . . , λs, s = |S|, be the eigenvalues of P . Moreover, let f1, . . . , fs denote their cor-
responding eigenfunctions. For every x ∈ S, we then have (Pfi)(x)fi(x) = λifi(x). Since P is
reversible then we know that the eigenfunctions assume real values and that they form an orthonormal
basis for the space (Rs, 〈·, ·〉pi) (see, e.g., Lemma 12.2 in [25]). Then every real-valued function f de-
fined upon S can be expressed as a linear combination of the fi’s. Thus, there exist αi’s in R such
that∑
x∈S
pi(x)(Pf)(x)f(x) =
∑
x∈S
pi(x)
s∑
i=1
α2i (Pfi)(x)fi(x) =
∑
x∈S
pi(x)
s∑
i=1
α2iλif
2
i (x) ≥ 0.
To specify the restrictions of the transition matrix we are interested in, let G be a game with profile
space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit dynamics for G; we say that a |A|× |A|matrix P ′,
with A ⊆ S, is a nice restriction of P if there exists L ⊆ A, L 6= ∅, such that P ′(x,x) ≥ P (x,x) for
x ∈ L, P ′(x,y) = P (x,y) if x,y ∈ L, x 6= y, and is 0 otherwise. Note that P is a nice restriction of
itself. We generalize the result given in [3] to nice restrictions of the transition matrix of logit dynamics
for potential games.
Lemma 4.2. Let G be a game with profile space S, let P be the transition matrix of the logit dynamics
for G and let P ′ be a nice restriction of P with state space A. If P is reversible then no eigenvalue of P ′
is negative.
Proof. Firstly, note that since P is reversible with respect to pi then the nice restriction P ′, defined upon
a subset of statesA, is reversible with respect to pi′ defined as pi restricted toA, i.e., pi′(x) = pi(x)/pi(A)
for x ∈ A.
Assume for sake of contradiction that there exists an eigenvalue λ < 0 of P ′. Let fλ be an eigen-
function of λ. Note that since P ′ is reversible then fλ is real-valued. By definition, fλ 6= 0; hence,
since λ < 0 and as (P ′fλ)(x) = λfλ(x), then for every profile x ∈ A such that fλ(x) 6= 0 we have
sign ((P ′fλ)(x)) 6= sign (fλ(x)) and thus
〈P ′fλ, fλ〉pi′ =
∑
x∈A
pi′(x)(P ′fλ)(x)fλ(x) < 0.
Let L denote the maximal subset of A for which P ′ is a nice restriction of P . Let us denote with
PL the transition matrix on the state space A such that PL(x,y) = P (x,y) for every x,y ∈ L and
PL(x,y) = 0 otherwise. Then we can write P ′ as PL + (P ′−PL): by the definition of nice restriction
(P ′ − PL) is a non-negative diagonal matrix. Therefore, (P ′ − PL) is reversible with respect to pi′.
Since the eigenvalues of a diagonal matrix are exactly the diagonal elements, we have that (P ′ − PL)
has non-negative eigenvalues and then, by Lemma 4.1, 〈(P ′ − PL)fλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0. Moreover, for every i
and for every z−i, we denote with Pi,z−i the matrix such that for every x,y ∈ A
Pi,z−i(x,y) =
1
nZi(z−i)
{
eβui(y), if x−i = y−i = z−i and x,y ∈ L;
0, otherwise.
(6)
Observe that Pi,z−i has at least one non-zero row and that all non-zero rows of Pi,z−i are the same. Thus
Pi,z−i has rank 1, and hence since it is a non-negative matrix all its eigenvalues are non-negative [22]
9.
Moreover, since all off-diagonal entries of Pi,z−i are either 0 or equal to the corresponding entry of P
′ we
can conclude that Pi,z−i is reversible with respect to pi
′. Thus, Lemma 4.1 yields 〈Pi,z−ifλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0.
Finally, observe that PL =
∑
i
∑
z−i Pi,z−i . Hence from the linearity of the inner product, it follows
that 〈P ′fλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0 and thus we reach a contradiction.
It is immediate to see that the restricted chain P˚L defined in (2) is a nice restriction of P and hence
all its eigenvalues are non-negative by the lemma above.
9This result about the eigenvalues of matrices with rank 1 appears as an exercise at page 61 of [22] and in [32].
17
Mixing time of the restricted chains
Before bounding the mixing time of the restricted chain we prove a very important preliminary lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let β ≥ β0, ε > 0, and let G be a sequence of n-player potential games asymptotically
well-behaved for β. Let p, q the functions generated by G. Consider the sequence of sets Ri returned by
Ap,q. Then, for n sufficiently large and for every A ⊆ Ri, we have
BRi(A) ≥
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
,
where ` is at least super-polynomial.
Proof. Let us postpone the exact definition of ` and suppose, by contradiction, that there are infinitely
many n for which there is A ⊂ Ri such that BRi(A) < 1p(n) − 1`(n) .
We will show that for n sufficiently large either B (A) ≤ 1/q(n) or B(A) ≤ 1/q(n), where A =
Ri \ A. Then, since they are contained in Ri and hence their stationary probability is less than pi (Ri),
one of these set must be chosen before Ri by Ap,q. But since in the third step of Algorithm 4.1 either at
least one element of such sets should be deleted from N or the algorithm terminates, as a consequence,
we have that Ri cannot be returned by the algorithm, thus a contradiction.
Consider the function v(·) that sets v(n) = pi(A)Q(A,S\Ri) . We distinguish two cases depending on how
v evolves as n grows.
If v(·) is at least super-polynomial in the input: We have
B (A) =
Q (A,S \A)
pi (A)
=
Q (A,Ri \A)
pi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
=
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈Ri\A pi(x)P (x,y)
pi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
=
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈Ri\A piRi(x)P˚Ri(x,y)
piRi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
= BRi (A) +
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
<
1
p(n)
+
1
v(n)
− 1
`(n)
.
By taking `(n) ≤ v(n) for each n sufficiently large, we have that B (A) < 1p(n) . Then, since G is
asymptotically well-behaved, from Definition 4.2 it follows that B (A) ≤ 1q(n) .
If v(·) is polynomial in the input: Note that Q(A,S\Ri)pi(Ri) +
Q(A,S\Ri)
pi(Ri)
= B (Ri) ≤ 1q(n) , otherwise Ri was
not returned by the algorithm. Hence, we obtain
Q (A,S \Ri) ≤ 1
q(n)
· pi (Ri) and Q
(
A,S \Ri
) ≤ 1
q(n)
· pi (Ri) .
From the first of these inequalities, we have pi (A) ≤ v(n)q(n) · pi (Ri). Hence
Q
(
A,A
)
pi (Ri)
≤ v(n)
q(n)
· Q
(
A,A
)
pi (A)
=
v(n)
q(n)
·BRi (A) <
v(n)
q(n)
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)
.
Then we obtain
B
(
A
)
=
Q
(
A,S \A)
pi
(
A
) = Q (A,A)
pi (Ri)− pi (A) +
Q
(
A,S \Ri
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A)
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(by reversibility of P ) =
Q
(
A,A
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A) +
Q
(
A,S \Ri
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A)
≤ v(n)
q(n)
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)(
1− v(n)
q(n)
)−1
+
1
q(n)
(
1− v(v)
q(n)
)−1
= O
(
1
q(n)− v(n)
)
,
where the upper bounds hold for each choice of super-polynomial function `. Since q(n)−v(n) evolves
at least as a super-polynomial, if n is sufficiently large, B(A) < 1p(n) . Then, since G is asymptotically
well-behaved, from Definition 4.2 it follows that B
(
A
) ≤ 1q(n) .
Now we are ready to prove the mixing time of the chain restricted to Ri is polynomial.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Fix n. Consider the set of profilesA? ⊂ Ri that minimizesBRi (A) among all
A ⊂ Ri such that piRi (A) ≤ 1/2. By Lemma 4.3, BRi (A?) ≥ 1/p(n)− 1/`(n) for each n sufficiently
large.
Moreover, for each n and each x ∈ Ri, since |S| ≤ m(n)n, it follows that
log
1
piRi (x)
≤ log |S|e
−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
≤ log e
n logm(n)e−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
= n logm(n) + β (Φmax − Φmin) ,
where Φmax and Φmin denote the maximum and minimum of the potential Φ overall possible strategy
profiles. Since Φmax − Φmin ≤ n ·∆(n) and β ≤ ρ(n)/∆(n), then
log
1
piRi (x)
≤ n · (logm(n) + ρ(n)) .
Then, from Lemma 4.2 and the properties of the relaxation time (see Theorems 2.3 and 2.1) it follows
that the mixing time is
tRimix(ε) ≤
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)−2
· (n logm(n) + ρ(n)) · 2 log 4
ε
= O(p?(n)).
Since p, logm and ρ are at most polynomial and ` is at least a super-polynomial, then p? is at most
polynomial in its input and the lemma follows.
4.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
In order to prove Proposition 4.2, we show that there is a strong relationship between hitting time and
metastability (see Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 4.9) and, in particular, that high hitting time implies the
existence of a subset with small bottleneck ratio. Note that N contains subsets of small bottleneck ratio
only if at some iteration Ti is empty. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the cores are not empty for
asymptotically well-behaved games (see Lemma 4.10).
The relation between bottleneck ratio and hitting time
For a game Gn with potential function Φ and profile space S, and a rationality level β, let P be the
transition matrix of the Markov chain defined by the logit dynamics on Gn. For a non-empty L ⊆ S, we
denote with PL the matrix
PL(x,y) =
{
P (x,y) if x,y ∈ L;
0 otherwise.
(7)
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Let λL1 ≥ λL2 ≥ . . . ≥ λL|S| be the eigenvalues of PL: notice that λL1 can be different from 1 since the
matrix PL is not stochastic. Observe that PL is a nice restriction of P . Hence, Lemma 4.2 implies that
λL1 ≥ λL2 ≥ . . . ≥ λL|S| ≥ 0, and thus for λLmax, the largest eigenvalue of PL in absolute value, we have:
λLmax = max
i
|λLi | = λL1 .
We start with two characterizations of 1− λLmax in terms of bottleneck ratio. The first one is an easy
extension of the similar characterization of the spectral gap of stochastic matrices.
Lemma 4.4. For finite β and every ∅ 6= L ⊆ S, 1− λLmax ≤ B(L).
Proof. Define the function ϕL : S → [0, 1] to be such that ϕL(x) = pi(L) if x ∈ L, and ϕL(x) = 0
otherwise. Consider now the function
EP (ϕL) := 1
2
∑
x,y∈S
pi(x)P (x,y)(ϕL(x)− ϕL(y))2. (8)
By Theorem 4.1, pi(L) 6= 0 and then Epi
[
ϕ2L
]
= pi(L)3 6= 0. Moreover, by recalling the definition
of ∂L as the set of profiles x ∈ L that have at least one neighbor profile in S \ L and denoting with
E(A1, A2) the pairs of neighbor profiles (x,y) such that x ∈ A1 and y ∈ A2. We have:
EP (ϕL) = pi(L)
2
2
 ∑
(x,y)∈E(L,S\L)
pi(x)P (x,y) +
∑
(x,y)∈E(S\L,L)
pi(x)P (x,y)

= pi(L)2
∑
x∈∂L
pi(x)
∑
y∈S\L :
H(x,y)=1
P (x,y) = pi(L)2Q(L, S \ L),
where we used the reversibility of P in the penultimate equality. Hence, we have EP (ϕL)
Epi[ϕ2L]
= B(L). The
lemma follows since 1− λLmax ≤ EP (ϕL)Epi[ϕ2L] (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix).
The second characterization may be proved in exactly the same way as a similar well-known char-
acterization for the spectral gap of stochastic matrices (see, for example, Section 13.3.3 in [25]).
Lemma 4.5. For every ∅ 6= L ⊆ S,
1− λLmax ≥
(BL? )
2
2
.
Finally, let us recall a couple of lemmata relating τS\L and λLmax and already stated in e.g. [29].
Lemma 4.6. For a reversible Markov chain with state space S, every L ⊆ S and every t it holds that
max
x∈L
Px (τS\L > t) ≥ exp
(
t log λLmax
)
.
Lemma 4.7. For a reversible Markov chain with state space S, every L ⊆ S and every t it holds that
Px (τS\L > t) ≤ exp
(
t log λLmax +
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
,
where piL(x) has been defined in (1).
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Since the statement of Lemma 4.7 is slightly different from the ones found in previous literature, we
provide a proof in Appendix A.2 for sake of completeness.
The above lemmata represent the main ingredients to prove the following relations between bottle-
neck ratio and hitting time.
Lemma 4.8. Let Gn be a potential game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the
logit dynamics for Gn. Then for finite β and L ⊂ S, L 6= ∅, we have
min
x∈L
Px (τS\L ≤ t) ≤ t · B(L)
1−B(L) .
Proof. We observe:
min
x∈L
Px (τS\L ≤ t) = 1−max
x∈L
Px (τL > t)
(by Lemma 4.6) ≤ 1− exp
(
t log λLmax
)
= 1− exp
(
t log(1− (1− λLmax))
)
(since 1− a ≥ e− a1−a ) ≤ 1− exp
(
−t1− λ
L
max
λLmax
)
(by Lemma 4.4) ≤ 1− exp
(
−t · B(L)
1−B(L)
)
(since 1− e−a ≤ a) ≤ t · B(L)
1−B(L) .
Moreover, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. Let Gn be a potential game with profile space S and P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for Gn. For β > 0, ∅ 6= L ⊂ S, x ∈ L and 0 < ε < 1, we have
T εS\L(x) ≤ (BL? )−2
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ log
1
piL(x)
)
,
where piL(x) =
pi(x)
pi(L) and B
L
? = min A⊆L :
pi(A)≤1/2
B(A).
Proof. From Lemma 4.7 we know that the hitting time of S \ L can be expressed as a function of the
eigenvalues of the matrix PL. In particular, we have
Px (τS\L > t) ≤ exp
(
t log λLmax +
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
(since 1− a ≤ e−a) ≤ exp
(
−t
(
1− λLmax
)
+
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
(by Lemma 4.5) ≤ exp
[
−1
2
(
t(BL? )
2 − log 1
piL(x)
)]
(since e−a ≤ (1 + a)−1) ≤
(
1 +
1
2
(
t(BL? )
2 − log 1
piL(x)
))−1
.
Thus, by setting t = (BL? )
−2
(
2(1−ε)
ε + log
1
piL(x)
)
, we have Px (τS\L > t) ≤ ε and then T εS\L(x) is
upper bounded by this value of t.
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Bounding the hitting time
The following lemma turns out to be useful for proving fast hitting time of profiles not in N .
Lemma 4.10. Let β ≥ β0, ε > 0 and let G be a sequence of n-player potential games asymptotically
well-behaved for β. Let p, q the functions generated by G. Then, for each n, at the end of algorithm
Ap,q on input n,Gn, β, ε it holds that for each subset L ⊆ N such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2, B(L) ≥ 1/p(n).
Proof. Fix n. It is sufficient to prove that for each Ri chosen by Ap,q, its core Ti is non-empty. Indeed,
in this case, the algorithm ends only if no subset L ⊆ N such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2 has B(L) > 1/q(n).
Then, since G is asymptotically well-behaved, from Definition 4.2 it follows that the last condition is
equivalent to B(L) ≥ 1/p(n).
As for the non-emptiness of the core, Lemma 4.8 implies that there exists at least one x ∈ Ri such
that
Px
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ t
Ri
mix(ε) ·B(Ri)
1−B(Ri) ≤ ε,
where the last step holds for n sufficiently large since tRimix is at most polynomial by Proposition 4.1 and
B(Ri) is at most the inverse of a super-polynomial by hypothesis.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Fix n. Consider the set of profiles A? ⊆ N that minimizes B (A) among all
A ⊆ N such that pi (A) ≤ 1/2. By Lemma 4.10, B (A?) ≥ 1/p(n). Moreover, for each n and each
x ∈ N , observe that
log
1
piN (x)
≤ log |S|e
−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
≤ log e
n logm(n)e−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
= n logm(n) + β (Φmax − Φmin) ,
where Φmax and Φmin denote the maximum and minimum of the potential Φ overall possible strategy
profiles. Since Φmax − Φmin ≤ n ·∆(n) and β ≤ ρ(n)/∆(n), then
log
1
piN (x)
≤ n · (logm(n) + ρ(n)) = ρ′(n),
where, by assumption on m and ρ, ρ′ is a function at most polynomial in its input. Then, for every
x ∈ N , from Lemma 4.9 it follows
T εS\N (x) ≤
(
1
B (A?)
)2
·
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ log
1
piN (x)
)
≤ p(n)2 ·
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ ρ′(n)
)
= ρ?(n),
where ρ? is a function at most polynomial in its input, since p and ρ′ are.
4.3 Application to Specific Games
Let us now introduce some specific classes of games that have been recently studied in the logit dynamics
literature. We will show that all these games are asymptotically metastable.
4.3.1 The Curie-Weiss game
Consider the following game-theoretic formulation of the well-studied Curie-Weiss model (the Ising
model on the complete graph), that we will call CW-game: each one of n players has two strategies, −1
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and +1, and the utility of player i for profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1,+1}n is ui(x) = xi
∑
j 6=i xj .
Observe that for every player i it holds that
ui(x−i,+1)− ui(x−i,−1) = H(x−i,−1)−H(x−i,+1),
whereH(x) = −∑j 6=k xjxk. Hence the CW-game is a potential game with potential functionH.
It is known (see, e.g., Chapter 15 in [25]) that the logit dynamics for this game (or equivalently the
Glauber dynamics for the Curie-Weiss model) has mixing time polynomial in n for β < 1/n and super-
polynomial as long as β > 1/n. Moreover, [5] describes metastable distributions for β > c log n/n,
with c constant, and shows that such distributions are quickly reached from profiles where the number
of +1 (respectively −1) is a sufficiently large majority, namely if the magnetization k is such that
k2 > c log n/β, where the magnetization of a profile x is defined as M(x) =
∑
i xi.
It has been left open what happens when β lies in the interval (1/n, c log n/n) in which it is known
that the dynamics takes long time to mix, but we do not know if asymptotic metastability occurs, and if
a metastable distribution is quickly reached when in the starting point the number of +1 is close to the
number of −1. We observe that next lemma, along with Theorem 3.1 essentially closes this problem by
showing that CW-games are asymptotically metastable for β ≥ c/n for some constant c > 1.
Lemma 4.11. Let G be a sequence of n-player CW-games. Then the logit dynamics for G is asymptot-
ically metastable for every β > c/n, for constant c > 1.
Proof. We will next prove that G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for every β > c/n. The claim
then follows from Theorem 3.1.
Fix n and let S+ (resp., S−) be the set of profiles with positive (resp., negative) magnetization in
Gn. Let us set R1 = S+ and R2 = S−. It is known that the bottleneck ratio of these subset is super-
polynomial for every β > c/n, for constant c > 1, (see, e.g., Chapter 15 in [25]). Moreover, in [24] it
has been proved that the mixing time of the chain restricted to S+ (resp. S−) is actually c1n log n for
some constant c1 > 010.
Let now ζ be the unique positive root [14, 15] of the function
f(x) =
eβx(1− x)− e−βx(1 + x)
eβx(1− x) + e−βx(1 + x) .
Observe that ζ ∈ [0, 1], it is non decreasing in β and does not depend on n. Let now Z+ be the set of
profiles with magnetization k ≥ ζn and Z− be the set of profiles with magnetization k ≤ −ζn. Note
that for a constant c > 1 and n sufficiently large, we have that |k| ≥ 1 [15].
Consider now the following partition of S: T1 = Z+, T2 = Z− and N = S \ (Z+ ∪ Z−). We
prove that from every profile x ∈ Z+ the dynamics hits a profile y ∈ S− in a time equivalent to the
mixing time of the chain restricted to S+ with probability at most ε. Consider, indeed, the magnetization
chain, i.e., the birth and death chain on the space {−n, 2− n, . . . , n− 2, n}. Then we are interested in
the hitting time τl of l ≤ 0 when the starting point is k. Clearly, in order to reach magnetization l it is
necessary to reach magnetization k′, with l < k′ < k. And for reaching l from k′ it is necessary to reach
k′′ such that l ≤ k′′ < k′. Then, we show that there is k′ from which the chain quickly goes back to nζ
with high probability without ever hitting the profile k′′. In particular, in [14, Theorem 4.10] it has been
showed that there are k′ and k′′ such that
Pk′ (τnζ ≤ c2n log n) ≥ 1− o(1) and Pk′ (τk′′ ≥ c2n log n) ≥ 1− o(1).
10The result in [24] refers to censored chains, that are exactly the same as our restricted chain, except that the probability
that the original chain from a profile x goes out from L is “reflected” to some profile in L different from x, instead than being
“added” to the probability to stay in x. It is immediate to see how their result extends also to our restricted chains.
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Hence, it follows that
Pk (τl ≥ c1n log n) ≥ (1− o(1))κ = 1− o(1),
where κ is a constant depending only on c1 and c2. (Clearly, everything holds symmetrically by consid-
ering the set Z−.)
Finally, observe that from [14] (Theorems 4.4, 4.9 and 4.10 – see also [15]), we have that for each
profile x ∈ N , the hitting time of T1 ∪ T2 is polynomial with high probability.
The asymptotic metastability of the Curie-Weiss game was studied in [5], together with pure coordi-
nation games, and graphical coordination games on the ring. It is not hard to see that previously known
results about these last two games can be easily derived within our framework.
4.3.2 A Congestion Game
We now exemplify how our framework can be used to prove metastability for another class of games,
by sketching a proof that the following game inspired by the well-known Pigou’s congestion game is
asymptotically metastable.
There are two links, one has fixed cost z = k − ε with k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and ε > 0, whereas
the second one has congestion-dependent cost c(x), where c(x) denotes the number of players choosing
this second linkin the profile x. It is well known that this game is a potential game [34], with potential
function Φ(x) =
[
z(n− c(x)) +∑c(x)i=1 i] = 12 (2zn− 2zc(x) + c(x)(c(x) + 1)). We next show that
the logit dynamics for this game is partitioned, from which it follows that the game is asymptotically
metastable.
Consider, indeed, all profiles such that there are k players on the second link, i.e., the one with
congestion dependent cost. Observe that there are
(
n
k
)
> 1 of these profiles, and for each of them we
define Ri that contains only this profile. Observe that the inverse of bottleneck ratio of this profile is
e−βε that is super-polynomial for β sufficiently large (it is easy to see that for smaller β the mixing
time is polynomial). Since these sets are singletons, it is immediate that their mixing time is at most
polynomial and it must hard to leave this set from Ti = Ri. It is only left to prove that the logit
dynamics converges to one of these sets quickly from every other profile. However, this immediately
follows by a simple birth-and-chain argument, by observing that, for large β, the number of players
adopting the congestion-dependent link increases with large probability if c(x) < k and decrease with
high probability if c(x) > k.
4.3.3 Opinion Formation Games on Social Networks
Another class of games that has been recently analyzed under the lens of the logit dynamics has been the
class of opinion formation games [18]. Here, agent i must express an opinion xi from a discrete set. Let
us assume for simplicity that the available opinions are only {0, 1}. Agent i is moreover provided with a
private belief bi ∈ [0, 1]. Agents are located on vertices of a graph representing a social network. Then,
agent’s opinion is the compromise between her own private belief on the topic at the hand, and the public
opinion expressed by “friends” on the social network. This compromise is represented through the utility
function of agents, that involve two components: the first one, (xi−bi)2, measures the distances between
agent i’s public opinion and her own private belief, whereas the second component,
∑
j∈N(i)(xi−xj)2,
measures the distance between agent i’s public opinion and the opinion of each agent j that is a neighbor
of i in the social network. Opportune weights may be set to balance these two components and also to
balance the contributions of different neighbors.
To exemplify the application of our framework to these games, let us consider a specific setting, in
which bi = 1/2 and the underlying network is Km,m, i.e., the complete bipartite graph with m nodes
in each side. We next observe that this game is partitioned by the logit dynamics, and thus it enjoys
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asymptotic metastability. To this aim, let us define R0 as the subset of profiles x such that there is a
path x0, . . . ,xk, with x0 = (0, . . . , 0), xk = x, x` and x`−1 diverging only in the opinion of a single
agent, and in each profile of the path there are less than κ edges whose endpoint have discording edges,
where κ = dm2/2e. Similarly one can define R1. It follows from [18] that these two sets have super-
polynomial bottleneck ratio for β sufficiently large. Moreover, it is not hard to see that the mixing time
of the chain restricted to these sets is polynomial. This can be proved by adapting an argument used in
[3] for bounding the mixing time of games with dominant strategies. Finally, with arguments similar to
the one described above in Lemma 4.11, one can see that there are T0 and T1 from which it is hard to
leave R0 and R1, respectively, but that are easy to reach from each remaining profile.
5 Additional applications
While the main objective of this work is to prove that for every potential game the behavior of the logit
dynamics is always asymptotically metastable, we observe that metastability and the tool that we pro-
posed in this work, namely the concept of partitioned Markov chain, may be of independent interest and
of broader application also outside game theory. Below we sketch a setting in which the corresponding
Markov chain appears to be partitioned, and one in which the resulting metastable behavior may play a
fundamental role.
5.1 Graph Clustering Algorithms
Given a graph G = (V,E) with maximum degree bounded by d, and a subset S ⊆ V , the outer
conductance of S is the ratio between the number of edges between S and V \ S, and d|S|. The inner
conductance of S is the minimum among all subset T ⊆ S with |T | ≤ |S|/2 of #edges(T,S\T )d|T | . Given
a parameter ε, the graph G is defined to be (k, φ)-clusterable, if it can be partitioned into no more than
k parts, such that the inner conductance of the induced subgraph on each part is at least φ and the outer
conductance of each part is at most cd,kε4φ2 , where cd,k depends only on d and k.
Czumaj et al. [12] studied the problem of recognizing the cluster structure of a graph in the frame-
work of property testing. Specifically, they present a sublinear algorithm that takes in input a graph with
bounded degree d and parameters k, φ, and ε and tests if the graph is either (k, φ)-clusterable or we
need to add or delete more than εdn edges to obtain a (k, φ∗)-clusterable graph, where φ∗ = c′d,k
φ2ε4
logn
and c′d,k depends only on d and k.
The algorithm proposed is roughly as follows: run a random walk on the graph for about logn
φ2
steps
starting from k log k starting nodes chosen uniformly at random; if two different walks ends up with a
close distribution, then the algorithm assigns them to the same cluster, otherwise they are assigned to
different clusters. In other words, the algorithm is exploiting the asymptotic metastability of the random
walk on a graph with bounded degree d with respect to a class C of functions that are logarithmic in n
and quadratic in 1/φ: for every starting point of the walk, it mixes within this time frame in a subgraph
whose inner conductance is at least φ and whose outer conductance is at most cd,kε4φ2, and remains
therein for an amount of time that is at least the square of this time frame (when the dynamics starts
outside any clusters, or at very border of it, the convergence is not guaranteed to a single cluster but to a
combination of them; still the algorithm of [12] deals this case by discarding these starting points).
In particular, this metastable behavior follows from our Theorem 3.1 since the random walk is parti-
tioned with respect to these functions: if there are k clusters with outer conductance cd,kε4φ2, then there
areR1, . . . , Rk with bottleneck ratio at least 1/φ4; Moreover, if these clusters have inner conductance at
most φ, then the corresponding restricted chain mixes in time O
(
logn
φ
)
and there is a non-empty subset
of profiles from which it is hard to leave the subset within this time frame.
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Clearly, most of the work in [12] is in how to exploit this metastable behavior to design an algorithm
with the desired properties. We believe, however, that Theorem 3.1 can be an useful tool for the analysis
of randomized algorithms and, it may suggest that the idea developed in a setting (e.g., the idea of [12]
about graph clustering) may be useful to other settings in which a similar metastable behavior holds.
Such an example can be found in the very recent work of Cruciani et al. [11]. They have analyzed the
2-choice dynamics, according to which each node can be in one of two states, and at each time step each
node u randomly selects a pair of neighbors, and, if these neighbors have the same state, then u copies
it. They proved that on graphs consisting of two well-separated clusters, the 2-choice dynamics enjoys
asymptotic metastability. They in fact prove that the corresponding Markov chain is partitioned (even if
they do not explicitly use this terminology): there are four classes of configurations, the ones in which
almost every node in both the clusters of the graph have the same state, and the ones in which nodes
in different clusters have different states; they then focus only on the latter ones, and they show that
the dynamics remains within these configurations for polynomial time, whereas these configurations are
quickly reached (in logarithmic time) as long as the starting point of the chain is sufficiently far away
from the configurations in which both clusters have the same state.
5.2 Random Network Generation
Several varieties of random graph models have been developed in recent years to explain characteristic
of observed real-world networks. A key model, extensively used in sociology literature [30, 37], is
the exponential random graph model. The model is defined in terms of the number of subgraphs X
(e.g., number of edges, or number of triangles) contained in the network; each of these subgraph has a
weight βi and the number of occurrence of each subgraph and their weights define the so-called graph
Hamiltonian H(G); the model then returns a graph G with probability P (G) ≈ eH(G).
Sampling from this distribution is crucial for parameter estimation property testing, and for adopting
this model in experimental analysis of networks. Typically, sampling has been carried out using the
Glauber dynamics procedure. In the implementation of this procedure, a very important role is played
by weights βi. In particular, Bhamidi et al. [6] distinguish the behavior of the Glauber dynamics in
two regimes: the high temperature regime in which essentially there is a unique local minimum in the
graph Hamiltonian, and the low temperature regime in which the Hamiltonian has more than one local
minimum.
Despite the relevance of this network model and the widespread use of Glauber dynamics to sample
from this model, this practice has been strongly criticized in [6]. Indeed, therein it has been observed that
the Glauber dynamics quickly converges to the desired distribution in the high temperature regime, but
in this case the resulting distribution is not significantly different from the one resulting from applying
the simpler, and faster, Erdos-Renyi graph model, known to violate many desired properties.
Moreover, Bhamidi et al. [6] also show that in the low temperature regime the Glauber dynamics
takes exponential time to converge to the desired distribution, and hence conclude that this procedure
is infeasible in this regime. In particular, their argument shows that when the Glauber dynamics starts
close to one of the local minima of the graph Hamiltonian, then it takes exponential time to leave this
neighborhood. In other words, there are subsets of states of the chain with bottleneck ratio at most
the inverse of an exponential function, and there are states within these subsets from which it takes
exponential time to leave the subset. These properties suggest that the dynamics may be partitioned and
thus, by Theorem 3.1, enjoy asymptotic metastability.
This sheds new light on the convergence of the Glauber dynamics to the desired distribution: even
if the convergence to the stationary distribution may take long time starting from specific states, by
proving the dynamics is partitioned, one would know that a (meta)stable distribution is still reached
from every starting point. Then one may ask how “good” is this distribution (e.g., how far is it from the
Erdos-Renyi model) or if there are classes of starting configurations from which the dynamics reaches
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good metastable distributions. In other words, our framework may open new avenues in the analysis of
sampling techniques, showing they partially work even when their mixing time is large.
6 Conclusions and open problems
In this work we prove that for every asymptotically well-behaved potential game and every starting
point of this game there is a distribution that is metastable for super-polynomial time and it is quickly
reached. Even if our definition of asymptotically well-behaved potential games was introduced to model
the games for which it makes sense to give asymptotic results about the logit dynamics, one may wonder
if our techniques captures all the cases in which asymptotically metastability is possible. For example,
we know that the larger counterpart of asymptotically-well behaved games defined in Appendix C is
sufficient, but is it also necessary? The main obstacle for proving this direction consists in the absence
of any tool for proving or disproving metastability of distributions that are largely different from the ones
considered in this work. Also, given that our arguments are game-independent, it would be interesting
to see whether sufficient and necessary conditions can be refined for specific subclasses of games.
Our convergence rate results hold if β is small enough. As we mention above, an assumption on β
is in general necessary because when β is high enough logit dynamics roughly behaves as best-response
dynamics; moreover, the convergence in polynomial-time of best-response dynamics for potential games
is known to be hard [17]. Interestingly, this difference in the behavior of the logit dynamics for different
values of β suggests that “the more noisy the system is, the more (meta)stable it is.”
Our result is in a sense existential, since it is not practical to explicitly describe the distributions
via the execution of Algorithm 4.1. It is then an interesting open problem to characterize the sets Ri’s
and Ti’s returned by this algorithm for some specific classes of games in order to understand better the
stability guarantee of the distributions. A better understanding of spectra of the transition matrix along
the lines of the results we prove in Appendix D may help in answering some of the questions above.
Naturally, there are other questions of general interest about metastability that we do not consider.
For example, akin to price of anarchy and price of stability, one may ask what is the performance of a
system in a metastable distribution? One might also want to investigate metastable behavior of different
dynamics in potential games, such as best-response dynamics. However, in the latter case, no matter
what selection rule is used to choose which player has to move next, a profile is never visited twice
in time since at each step the potential goes down. Therefore, the “transient” behavior of best-response
dynamics would roughly correspond to a (possibly exponentially long) sequence of profiles visited. This,
however, would not add much to our understanding of the transient phase of best-response dynamics.
Finally, we believe that the concept of asymptotic metastability and tool of partitioned chain that we
introduced in this work, may be of independent interest and with broad applications in algorithm design
and analysis: we highlighted a few of these applications in Section 5, but we believe that many other
applications are just behind the corner.
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A Background material
In this section, we give some background on a couple of techniques adopted to prove our results: cou-
pling of Markov chains, and tools to bound the hitting time.
A.1 Markov chain coupling
A coupling of two probability distributions µ and ν on a state space S is a pair of random variables
(X,Y ) defined on S × S such that the marginal distribution of X is µ and the marginal distribution of
Y is ν. A coupling of a Markov chainM on S with transition matrix P is a process (Xt, Yt)∞t=0 with
the property that Xt and Yt are both Markov chains with transition matrix P . Similarly, a coupling of
Markov chainsM, M¯ both defined on S with transition matrices P and P¯ , respectively, is a process
(Xt, Yt)
∞
t=0 with the property that Xt is a Markov chain with transition matrix P and Yt is a Markov
chain with transition matrix P¯ .
When the two coupled chains start at (X0, Y0) = (x,y), we write Px,y (·) for the probability of an
event on the space S × S. The following theorem establishes the importance and the usefulness of the
coupling.
Theorem A.1 (Coupling (see, e.g., Proposition 4.7 and Theorem 5.2 in [25])). LetM, M¯ be two Markov
chains with finite state space S and transition matrices P and P¯ , respectively. For each pair of states
x,y ∈ S consider a coupling (Xt, Yt) ofM and M¯ with starting states X0 = x and Y0 = y. Then∥∥P t(x, ·)− P¯ t(y, ·)∥∥
TV
≤ Px,y (Xt 6= Yt) .
This theorem is mainly used for bounding the distance of a Markov Chain to the stationary distribu-
tion.
A.2 Hitting time tools
Consider a reversible Markov chain with state space S and transition matrix P . ForL ⊆ S let PL, λLi and
λLmax as defined in Section 4.2.3. Here we give a well known (see, e.g., [29]) variational characterization
of λLmax as expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Consider a reversible Markov chain with state space S, transition matrix P and stationary
distribution pi. For every L ⊆ S we have
1− λLmax = infϕ
EP (ϕ)
Epi [ϕ2]
,
where EP (ϕ) is defined as in (8), Epi
[
ϕ2
]
=
∑
x pi(x)ϕ
2(x) and the inf is taken over functions ϕ such
that ϕ(x) = 0 for x ∈ S \ L and Epi
[
ϕ2
] 6= 0.
Since the statement of Lemma 4.7 is slightly different from the ones found in previous literature, we
attach a proof for sake of completeness.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let ϕL be the characteristic function on L, that is ϕL(x) = 1 if x ∈ L and 0
otherwise. Then
Px (τS\L > t) =
∑
y∈S
P t
L
(x,y) =
∑
y∈S
P t
L
(x,y)ϕL(y) = (P
t
L
ϕL)(x). (9)
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Since PL is reversible with respect to piL, we have that its eigenvectors, ψ1, . . . , ψ|S|, form an orthonor-
mal basis with respect to the inner product 〈·, ·〉piL : in particular we can write ϕL =
∑
i αiψi, where∑
i αi = 1 and each αi ≥ 0. Hence and from the linearity of the inner product we have
〈P t
L
ϕL, P
t
L
ϕL〉piL =
∑
i
∑
j
〈αi
(
λLi
)t
ψi, αj
(
λLj
)t
ψj〉piL
(by orthogonality) =
∑
i
(
λLi
)2t 〈αiψi, αiψi〉piL
≤
(
λLmax
)2t 〈ϕL, ϕL〉piL = (λLmax)2t ,
(10)
where the last equality follow from the definition of ϕL. Moreover,
piL(x)[(P
t
L
ϕL)(x)]
2 ≤
∑
y∈S
piL(y)[(P
t
L
ϕL)(y)]
2 = 〈P t
L
ϕL, P
t
L
ϕL〉piL . (11)
The theorem follows from (9), (10), (11).
B Asymptotically Well-Behaved Games: The Route to the Definition
In this section we will incrementally identify all the necessary technical properties that one needs to
model sequences of games for which the behavior of the logit dynamics is asymptotically well-defined.
We will show how this leads to our Definition 4.2.
B.1 First Tentative
Let us start by assuming that all potential games are asymptotically well-behaved. Lemma B.1 shows
that this is not the case and we need a more restrictive definition.
Lemma B.1. There is a sequence of n-player potential gamesG which is not asymptotically metastable
for every β sufficiently high and every ε < 14 .
Proof. We will show a sequence of n-player games G such that for every 0 < ε < 1/4, for infinitely
many value of n and for each polynomial p in n and each super-polynomial q in n, there is a profile
x of Gn such that the logit dynamics for Gn does not converge in time at most p(n) from x to any
(ε, q(n))-metastable distribution, even if the mixing time of the dynamics is larger than p(n).
Consider the following pairs (pj , qj), where pj = nj and qj = exp
(
log n · log(j)n
)
, where log(j)
is the j-th functional iteration of the logarithm function. Let us denote as nj a value such that pj(nj) <
qj(nj) − ε. Such a value surely exists since p is polynomial and q is super-polynomial. Moreover,
observe that for each n > nj , we have pj(n) < qj(n) − ε. Thus, we can assume without loss of
generality that 1 = n0 < n1 < n2 < . . .. Now let T be a function that is asymptotically sandwiched
between pj and qj , for every j. This can be guaranteed by letting T be a function such that T (n) =
qj(n) − ε for j such that nj < n ≤ nj+1. Note that for every pj and for every n ≥ nj , we have
T (n) = qk(n)− ε > pk(n) ≥ pj(n), where k ≥ j is such that nk ≤ n < nk+1. Similarly, for every qj
and for every n ≥ nj we have T (n) = qk(n)− ε < qk(n) ≤ qj(n). The situation is depicted in Figure
1.
Let now G be a sequence of n-player potential games such that, for each Gn, each player has exactly
two strategies, say 0 and 1. Consider the potential function Φ of Gn such that for every t = 0, . . . , n− 1
and every profile xwherein exactly t players play strategy 1 we have Φ(x) = n−t, while Φ(1, . . . , 1) =
1 + kn, where kn = 1β log
(T (n)
ε − 1
)
, β being the rationality parameter of the logit dynamics.
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Figure 1: The figure shows how T (n) is built around the functions pj’s and qj’s so that it is hard to
classify T (n) either as a polynomial or as a super-polynomial. Note that T (n) is the inverse of the
bottleneck ratio of profile (1, . . . , 1) and thus it describes the time needed to leave that profile.
Observe that if there is a pair (p, q) with p polynomial in n and q super-polynomial in n such that
it is possible to prove that the logit dynamics for Gn is asymptotic metastable with parameters p(n) and
q(n), then there is j? such that the results holds also with (pj?(n), qj?(n)) in place of p(n) and q(n),
where (pj? , qj?) corresponds to one of the pair of functions described above. Hence, in order to prove
the lemma is sufficient to show that it holds only for pairs (pj(n), qj(n)) as described above.
Note that, by taking β sufficiently high, we have that: (i) pi(0, . . . , 0) ≥ 12 ; (ii) there exists a j such
that, for every subset L ⊆ {0, 1}n \ {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}, the bottleneck ratio B(L) is at least the
inverse of pj ; (iii) the bottleneck ratio B(1, . . . , 1) = εT (n) .
Firstly note that the mixing time of logit dynamics for Gn is not polynomial. Indeed, from Theo-
rem 2.2, it follows that the mixing time is at least T4ε . However, as suggested above, for each pj , we
have T4ε > T > pj for infinitely many n, and hence the mixing time is asymptotically greater than every
polynomial pj .
We next discuss that no metastable distribution is stable for a super-polynomial time or, even if there
is one, it cannot be reached in polynomial time. From Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2, we have that for
each n the distribution pi1 that assigns probability 1 to the profile (1, . . . , 1) is (ε, T (n))-metastable.
However, as suggested above, for each qj , the function T is smaller than qj for infinitely many n. Thus,
the distribution pi1 is metastable for time that is asymptotically smaller than every super-polynomial qj .
Note that this argument extends to every (3ε, T (n))-metastable distribution µ that is within distance 2ε
from pi1. Finally, observe that, the remaining distributions that are far from pi1 cannot be reached quickly
from (1, . . . , 1). In fact, from Lemma 4.8 below, for every polynomial pj the probability that the logit
dynamics leaves the profile (1, . . . , 1) in pj steps, is at most
ε·pj
T −ε < ε, for n sufficiently large. Hence,
for every pj , starting from (1, . . . , 1) the pseudo-mixing time of every distribution µ that is at least 2ε-far
from pi1 is asymptotically greater than pj .
Remark B.1. The game described in the proof of Lemma B.1 also shows the necessity of having a
definition of asymptotic metastability as the one given in Definition 2.3.
Consider, indeed, the weaker definition of asymptotic metastability in which for each n there is a
polynomial pn(n) and a super-polynomial qn(n) governing convergence and stability time of metasta-
bility, respectively (i.e., a definition in which the order of quantifiers is reversed). This concept might
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at first glance look meaningful. However, it is instead of scarce significance as the distinction between
polynomials and super-polynomials might become null in the limit.
The game in Lemma B.1 exemplifies this phenomenon, since it does not satisfies the metastability
notion given in the one in Definition 2.3, but it satisfies this weak notion. Indeed, for every n, there
is a super-polynomial function, namely q˜n = qj − ε for j such that nj−1 < n ≤ nj , such that pi1 is
(ε, q˜n(n))-metastable. Obviously, the pseudo-mixing time of this distribution from the profile (1, . . . , 1)
is 1. From the remaining profiles, the dynamics quickly converges to the stationary distribution for every
β sufficiently large (this follows from well-known results about birth-and-death chains).
B.2 Second Tentative
The game described in the proof of Lemma B.1 is clearly a game for which it makes no sense to prove
asymptotic results about the behavior of the logit dynamics, since this object changes infinitely often.
Hence, we need to constrain the set of games of interest in this work.
To get an intuition of the condition that we are going to define, it is worth to look more closely at the
game of Lemma B.1. This game necessitates the update of the function T infinitely often when adding
a new player. This update is done so that the new profile (1, . . . , 1) has a bottleneck ratio that cannot
be described by any of the functions considered at that point. This process is never ending and gives no
asymptotic meaning to T in the limit.
The intuition is then that it does not make sense to prove asymptotic results about metastability of
the logit dynamics, whenever we need infinitely many functions for describing the bottleneck ratio of a
single profile as n changes, so that we are never able to classify the bottleneck ratio either as polynomial
or as super-polynomial. Recall that, for every profile x, its bottleneck is defined as follows:
B(x) =
∑
i
∑
si∈Si
P (x, (x−i, si)) =
1
n
∑
i
∑
si∈Si
si 6=xi
e−βΦ(x,(x−i,si))∑
zi∈Si e
−βΦ(x−i,zi)
= 1− 1
n
∑
i
1
1 +
∑
si∈Si
si 6=xi
e−β[Φ(x−i,si)−Φ(x)]
=
1
n
∑
i
∑
si∈Si
si 6=xi
e−β[Φ(x−i,si)−Φ(x)]
1 +
∑
si∈Si
si 6=xi
e−β[Φ(x−i,si)−Φ(x)]
.
(12)
Consider now a sequence of profiles x, one for each number n of players. In order to decide if B(x) is a
polynomial in n, one needs to look at how the potential values change with n. Towards this aim, it will be
useful to describe these potential values as monotone non-decreasing continuous functions f1, . . . , fk
of n. Here we say that fj describes Φ(x) if there are n0, c1, c2 such that for every n ≥ n0 we have
Φ(x) ∈ [c1fj(n), c2fj(n)]. If the number of these functions fj is unbounded, as in Lemma B.1, then
one may be unable to describe B(x) as the inverse of a polynomial or the inverse of a super-polynomial.
This line of reasoning can then bring one to suppose that, in order to prove asymptotic results about
metastability is sufficient that potential values can be described by a finite number of functions. Roughly
speaking, this means that potential values are concisely representable. Unfortunately, next lemma shows
that, even if game is constrained in this way, we can still design a game for which it does not make sense
to prove asymptotic results about metastability.
Lemma B.2. There is a sequence of n-player (potential) games G that is not asymptotically metastable
for every β sufficiently high and every ε < 14 , even if potential values can be described by a finite number
of functions in n.
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Proof. As above we will show a sequence of n-player games G such that for every 0 < ε < 1/4, for
infinitely many value of n and for each polynomial p in n and each super-polynomial q in n, there is a
profile x of Gn such that the logit dynamics for Gn does not converge in time at most p(n) from x to any
(ε, q(n))-metastable distribution, even if the mixing time of the dynamics is larger than p(n).
Let (pj , qj) be defined as in the proof of Lemma B.1. Moreover, let f1 and f2 two monotone non-
decreasing continuous functions in n with f1(n) ≥ qj(n)ε for every j, (e.g. f1 is exponential in n). Let us
denote as nj a value such that there is t
(j)
nj ∈ (pj(nj), qj(nj)) such that ε
t
(j)
nj
· njf1(nj)f2(nj)f1(nj)−f2(nj) −
njf2(nj)
f1(nj)−f2(nj)
is an integer. It is not hard to see that for every n > nj , there will be a value t
(j)
n in the interval
(pj(n), qj(n)) such that ε
t
(j)
n
· nf1(n)f2(n)f1(n)−f2(n) −
nf2(n)
f1(n)−f2(n) is an integer. Finally, let us define the function
T as follows: T (n) = t(j)n for j such that nj ≤ n < nj+1. Note that for every pj and for every n ≥ nj ,
we have T (n) = t(k)n > pk(n) ≥ pj(n), where k ≥ j is such that nk ≥ n < nk+1. Similarly, for every
qj and for every n ≥ nj we have T (n) = t(k)n < qk(n) ≤ qj(n).
Let now G be a sequence of n-player potential games such that, for each Gn, each player has exactly
two strategies, say 0 and 1. Consider the potential function Φ of Gn such that for every t = 0, . . . , n− 2
and every profile x wherein exactly t players play strategy 1 we have Φ(x) = n − t, Φ(1, . . . , 1) = 0,
whereas
kn =
ε
T (n) ·
nf1(n)f2(n)
f1(n)− f2(n) −
nf2(n)
f1(n)− f2(n) (13)
profiles with a single player playing strategy 1 have potential − log f2(n)β , and the remaining n − kn
profiles have potential − log f1(n)β . Observe that only n + 1 functions have been used for describing the
potential values of the game.
We will show that B(1, . . . , 1) = εT (n) , and hence the claim follows adopting exactly the same
arguments as in the proof of Lemma B.1. Indeed, from (12) it follows that
B(1, . . . , 1) =
1
n
(
kn
f2(n)
+
n− kn
f1(n)
)
,
from which the claim follows by simple algebraic manipulations and from (13).
B.3 Asymptotically Well-Described Games
Lemma B.2 shows that we need an even more restrictive definition of asymptotically well-behaved
games. To this aim, it will be useful to look more closely at (12) and at the game defined in the proof of
Lemma B.2.
The condition that potential values are described only by a bounded number of functions assures
that each term e−β[Φ(x−i,zi)−Φ(x)] can be in turn described by a bounded number of functions. Still, this
does not imply that even B(x) can be described by one among a finite number of functions. Indeed,
Lemma B.2 designs a game in which these finitely many functions are arranged in infinitely many ways
in order to make the bottleneck ratio of the profile (1, . . . , 1) to change infinitely often so that it is not
possible to classify it as a polynomial or as a super-polynomial.
Hence, the natural approach would be to establish that the games for which it makes sense to prove
asymptotic results about metastability not only have potential values described by a bounded number
of functions, but also for each profile the fraction of neighbors with a given potential value must be
described by a bounded number of functions.
Unfortunately, this definition is still insufficient to have meaningful asymptotic results. Indeed, when
the number of players increases, new profiles and new subsets of profiles are created. In order to describe
these new subsets of profiles, we need to list the potential values and the neighborhood of these subset.
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In particular, one may describe an instance similar to the one of Lemma B.1, except that the role that is
played by profile (1, . . . , 1), will be now played by a “newly created” profile for each n.
Hence, we must avoid that infinitely many “different” profiles are created as n increases. To this aim,
we will require that each new profile xmust be associated to a profile x′ with a lower number of players,
where, roughly speaking, associated means that x and x′ have the same behavior when compared with
the other profiles.
But we still have some issues. Indeed, whereas in the examples discussed above we considered a
single profile that is not metastable enough and still hard to leave, we can now consider a larger subset of
profiles for which this statement holds. And as discussed for single profiles, we need also to care about
every “newly created” subsets of profiles. For this reason, we need to extend the concept of association
from profiles to set of profiles, as follows.
Definition B.1. Let G be a potential game and β > 0. A subset L of profiles of Gn is said to be
associated to a subset L′ of profiles of Gn′ for a given β if there are monotone continuous functions11
f1, . . . , fk : R→ R, with finite k, such that χ(L, p) = fq(n) if and only if χ′(L′, p) = fq(n′), for every
p, q ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where
• χ(L, p) :=
∣∣∣∣{y ∈ ∂L : ∑kj=1 υ(y,j)e−βfj(n)∑k
j=1 ι(x,j)e
−βfj(n) = fp(n)
}∣∣∣∣;
• χ′(L′, p) :=
∣∣∣∣{y ∈ ∂L′ : ∑kj=1 υ(y,j)e−βfj(n′)∑k
j=1 ι(x,j)e
−βfj(n′) = fp(n
′)
}∣∣∣∣;
• ι(y, j) := |{z ∈ L : Φ(z)− Φ(y) = fj(n)}|;
• ι′(y, j) := |{z ∈ L′ : Φ(z)− Φ(y) = fj(n′)}|;
• υ(y, j) :=
∣∣∣{` ∈ [n] : ∑kw=1 η(y,`,w)e−βfw(n)∑k
w=1 γ(y,`,w)e
−βfw(n) = fj(n)
}∣∣∣;
• υ′(y, j) :=
∣∣∣∣{` ∈ [n′] : ∑kw=1 η(y,`,w)e−βfw(n′)∑k
w=1 γ(y,`,w)e
−βfw(n′) = fj(n
′)
}∣∣∣∣;
• γ(y, `, w) := |{s ∈ S` : Φ(s,y−`)− Φ(y) = fw(n)}|;
• γ′(y, `, w) := |{s ∈ S′` : Φ(s,y−`)− Φ(y) = fw(n′)}|;
• η(y, `, w) := |{s ∈ S` : (s,y−`) /∈ L and Φ(s,y−`)− Φ(y) = fw(n)}|;
• η′(y, `, w) := |{s ∈ S′` : (s,y−`) /∈ L′ and Φ(s,y−`)− Φ(y) = fw(n′)}|.
In words, γ and γ′ measure the number of profiles differing from y only in the strategy of player ` and
whose difference in potential with y is given by a certain function evaluated in n and n′, respectively;
η and η′ measure the same quantity but restricted only to neighbors of y outside the set L and L′,
respectively. Similarly, ι and ι′ measure the number of profiles in L whose potential difference with y
is given by a function of n and n′, respectively. Roughly speaking, these quantities are measuring the
relation between a profile y and the profiles that are either in L or in the neighborhood of L. Thus,
if these quantities for profile y ∈ L assume a given value as the corresponding quantities for profile
y′ ∈ L′, then this means that y and y′ have the same relation with other nodes in L and L′, respectively,
and with their neighborhoods. Since υ (υ′, respectively) aggregates γ and η (γ′ and η′, respectively), and
χ (χ′, respectively) aggregates ι and υ (ι′ and υ′, respectively), we have that if χ assumes the same value
11Although these functions depend on β, for the sake of readability, we suppress this dependence from the notation. A
similar consideration applies to Lemma B.3.
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as χ′, then profiles in ∂L and ∂L′ have the same relation with other profiles in L and L′, respectively,
and with their neighborhoods.
We observe that in the definition above we do not really need the ratios/difference to be equal to one
of the continuous functions. It is indeed sufficient that those quantities are very close to the value of the
function of interest. Specifically, we will use the following definition.
Definition B.2. Let G be a potential game and λ ≥ 0. A subset L of profiles of Gn is said to be λ-
associated to a subset L′ of profiles of Gn′ for a given β if there are monotone continuous functions
f1, . . . , fk : R→ R, with finite k, such that the definitions of Definition B.1 hold, except that whenever
we say that a ratio/difference r is equal to fj(x), j ∈ [k] and x ∈ {n, n′} we now only require that
r ∈ [(1− λ)fj(x), (1 + λ)fj(x)].
The next fact directly follows from this definition.
Lemma B.3. Let G be a potential game and λ ≥ 0. If a subset L of profiles of Gn is λ-associated to a
subsetL′ of profiles of Gn′ , with n′ < n, for a given β then there is a monotone non-deceasing continuous
function FL′ : R → R such that the bottleneck ratio for the logit dynamics for L′ is B(L′) = FL′(n′)
and the bottleneck ratio for the logit dynamics for L satisfies B(L) ∈ [FL′(n)(1− λ′), FL′(n)(1 + λ′)],
with λ′ > 0.
Proof. For sake of readability, we prove the claim only for λ = 0. The extension to different values of
λ is immediate. Observe that
B(L) =
1
n
∑
x∈∂L
pi(x)
∑
y/∈L P (x,y)
pi(L)
=
1
n
∑
x∈∂L
∑
i
∑
s∈Si : (s,x−i)/∈L e
−βΦ(s,x−i)∑
z∈Si e
−βΦ(z,x−i)∑
y∈L e−β[Φ(y)−Φ(x)]
=
1
n
∑
x∈∂L
∑
i
∑
s∈Si : (s,x−i)/∈L e
−β[Φ(s,x−i)−Φ(x)]∑
z∈Si e
−β[Φ(z,x−i)−Φ(x)]∑
y∈L e−β[Φ(y)−Φ(x)]
.
Since L is associated to L′ for the given β, then there are f1, . . . , fk as in Definition B.1. Moreover,∑
s∈Si : (s,x−i)/∈L
e−β[Φ(s,x−i)−Φ(x)] =
k∑
j=1
η(x, i, j)e−βfj(n)
∑
z∈Si
e−β[Φ(z,x−i)−Φ(x)] =
k∑
j=1
γ(x, i, j)e−βfj(n)
∑
y∈L
e−β[Φ(y)−Φ(x)] =
k∑
j=1
ι(x, j)e−βfj(n).
Hence, we have that
B(L) =
1
n
∑
x∈∂L
∑
i
∑k
j=1 η(x,i,j)e
−βfj(n)∑k
j=1 γ(x,i,j)e
−βfj(n)∑k
j=1 ι(x, j)e
−βfj(n)
=
1
n
∑
x∈∂L
∑k
j=1 υ(x, j)e
−βfj(n)∑k
j=1 ι(x, j)e
−βfj(n)
=
1
n
k∑
j=1
χ(L, j)e−βfj(n).
Similarly, we achieve that
FL′(n
′) = B(L′) =
1
n′
k∑
j=1
χ′(L′, j)e−βfj(n
′),
from which the claim immediately follows.
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We are now ready to redefine the concept of asymptotically well-behaved games. In order to distin-
guish this definition from Definition 4.2, we call these game asymptotically well-described.
Definition B.3. A potential game G is asymptotically well-described for β if there is n0 such that for
every n ≥ n0, every subset L of profiles of Gn is λ-associated, λ = O(1), with a subset L′ of profiles of
Gn0 for the given β.
We will call the constant n0 in the above definition the asymptotic basis of the game.
We next show that if a game is asymptotically well-described, then it is also asymptotically well-
behaved.
Lemma B.4. Let β > 0 and let G be a sequence of n-player potential games asymptotically well-
described for β, with n0 as its asymptotic basis. Then, there is a polynomial p and a super-polynomial
q such that for every n ≥ n0 and for every L′ ⊆ Sn, either B(L′) ≥ 1p(n) or B(L′) ≤ 1q(n) .
Proof. According to the definition of asymptotically well-behaved game and to Lemma B.3, there
is a subset L ⊆ S = S1 × · · · × Sn0 , a simple function FL, and a small constant λ such that
B(L′) ∈ [FL(n)(1− λ), FL(n)(1 + λ)]. Thus B(L′) can be upper-bounded by a polynomial if FL
is a polynomial and it can be lower-bounded by a super-polynomial if FL is a super-polynomial. Then,
it is only left to show that it is always possible to distinguish if FL is either a polynomial or a super-
polynomial. Indeed, since there are a finite number (specifically, at most mn0) of such functions FL,
we can partition the subsets of S in two (possibly empty) subsets S′ and S′′ such that for every L in S′,
FL(n) ≥ 1/p(n) and, for every L in S′′, FL(n) ≤ 1/q(n), for every n ≥ n0 and for p polynomial and
q super-polynomial.
C Asymptotically Well-Classified Games
The definition of asymptotically well-behaved games turns out to be a bit too stringent for our techniques.
Indeed, there are games for which the definition does not hold, but it is still possible to prove asymptotic
metastability through our framework.
Consider indeed the following game: the pure coordination game is an n-player game where players
have the same strategy set A and each player is happy when all players adopt the same strategy and
unhappy otherwise. It is not hard to see that this is a potential game with potential function Φ defined as
Φ(x) = 1 in every profile x where players do not coordinate and Φ(x) = 0 for the remaining profiles x.
Specifically, in [5], it has been considered the case in which each agent can choose between two
strategies, namely +1 and−1; each agent has utility 1 if all the players adopt the same strategy and utility
0 otherwise. The mixing time of the logit dynamics for these games is polynomial for β = O(log n) and
super-polynomial otherwise. Auletta et al. [5] show asymptotic metastability for every β = ω(log n).
Next lemma proves also that n-player pure coordination games are partitioned by the logit dynamics.
Lemma C.1. Let G be a sequence of n-player pure coordination game. Then G is partitioned by the
logit dynamics for every β = ω(log n).
Proof. Fix n and consider the following subsets of the set S of profiles of Gn: R1 = {p}, R2 = {m} and
R3 = {+1,−1}n \ {p,m}, where p = (+1)n and m = (−1)n. As showed in [5], the bottleneck ratio
of these subsets is super-polynomial for every β = ω(log n). Moreover, the mixing time of the chains
restricted to R1 and R2 is trivially polynomial. As for R3, observe that the stationary distribution of the
restricted chain is very close to the stationary distribution of a lazy random walk on an n-dimensional
hypercube, whose mixing time is known to be polynomial (see, e.g., [25]).
Also let us consider the following partition of S: Ti = Ri for i = 1, 2, 3 and N is empty. Clearly,
T1 and T2 satisfy the property required by the definition of partitioned chains. This holds also for
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T3. Indeed, consider a birth and death chain (see, e.g., Section 2.5 in [25]) defined on the state space
{0, 1, . . . ,m} with transition probability:
p0 = qm = r0 = rm =
1
2
, q0 = pm = 0; pi =
m− i
4m
, qi =
m+ i
4m
, ri =
1
2
, for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1;
where pi is the probability of going from state i to state i+ 1, qi is the probability of going from state i
to state i− 1 and ri is the probability to stay in state i.
If m = n/212, then the above birth an death chain can be seen as the projection of our chain, where
the state x of our chain is projected to the state i of the birth and death chain, such that the minimum
among the zeros and the ones in x is n2−i. Hence, the expected hitting time of either p orm is equivalent
to the expected hitting time of m. It is then easy to check that the expected hitting time of this state is
super-polynomial in n from every starting state (see, e.g., Section 2.5 in [25]). The claim finally follows
by a simple application of Markov’s inequality.
Still, the following lemma proves that it is not asymptotically well-behaved.
Lemma C.2. The pure coordination game is not asymptotically well-behaved.
Proof. Consider pj , qj as in Lemma B.1. Let nj be the first value of n such that there is an integer
t
(j)
n ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2} for which
T = 2ε ·
∑t(j)n
i=2
(
n
i
)(
n
2
)
+
( n
t
(j)
n
) ∈ [pj(n), qj(n)] .
Note that nj always exists since the size of the interval [pj(n), qj(n)] goes to infinity with n. Moreover,
if such an integer t(j)n exists for n = nj , then it exists also for every n > nj .
Now, for every n, we consider the set L(k)n that contains all profiles with at least two and at most
t
(k)
n players adopting strategy −1, where k is such that nk ≤ n ≤ nk+1. Observe that by definition
of t(j)n all profiles in L
(k)
n and their neighbors have the same potential. Hence, the bottleneck ratio of
L
(k)
n is exactly εT . Thus, for every j there always exists a subset such that its bottleneck is larger than
pj and smaller than qj . That is, we cannot find a polynomial p and a super-polynomial q that bound
the bottleneck ratio of all subsets of profiles of the game. Then, we can conclude that this game is not
asymptotically well-behaved.
This example shows a weakness of our definition of asymptotically well-behaved games. Specifi-
cally, in Definition 4.2 we requested that for these games it holds that we can asymptotically classify the
bottleneck ratio of each subset of profiles as either polynomial or super-polynomial. More specifically,
we can assume there are two functions p at most polynomial in the input and q at least super-polynomial
in the input such that for each β and each subset A the bottleneck ratio B(A) can be bounded by func-
tions that depends on either p or q. An equivalent viewpoint would be to see a sequence of n-player
potential games as a class to which a kind of oracle is attached that distinguishes between polynomial
and super-polynomial bottleneck ratios for every fixed β. Formally, given a sequence of n-player po-
tential games G and fixed β ≥ β0, this oracle can be described as follows: when it is queried about the
bottleneck ratio of a subset A with n players its answer states that the bottleneck ratio is either i) at most
polynomial if it is lower-bounded by 1/p(n); or ii) at least super-polynomial if it is upper-bounded by
1/q(n).
In turn, we proved that this oracle is sufficient to prove that the game can be partitioned by the logit
dynamics, and thus enjoys asymptotic metastability. However, the example above states that this oracle
12Here, we are assuming n is even. The case for odd n is similar.
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is not necessary. A more careful look to the pure coordination game discussed above actually highlights
that to prove asymptotic metastability of a game with respect to a polynomial p and a super-polynomial
q we do not need the behavior of each subset to be classified. That is, we can allow some subsets of
profiles to have bottleneck ratio in between the inverse of q and the inverse of p. In this case, we will
say that the subset of profiles is unclassified.
In this way, we can weaken our definition, by presenting a condition that describes which class of
subsets is sufficient to classify in order to have that the sets returned by Algorithm 4.1 enjoy the proper-
ties required by the definition of partitioned chains. In particular, we define the class of asymptotically
well-classified games as follows.
Definition C.1 (Asymptotically well-classified games). A sequence of n-player potential games G is
asymptotically well-classified for β ≥ β0 if for ε > 0 there exist a pair of functions p at most polynomial
and q at least super-polynomial, that for each n, satisfy the following conditions:
1. q(n) ≤ maxL : pi(L)≤1/2B−1(L);
2. for each Ri computed by Ap,q and for every L ⊂ Ri such that piRi(L) ≤ 1/2, if BRi(L) <
1/p(n), then both B(L) and B(Ri \ L) are not unclassified;
3. for each subset L ⊆ N , N being as at the end of the algorithmAp,q, such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2, B(L)
is not unclassified.
By careful looking at their proofs, one can check that Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 continue
to hold even if we substitute asymptotically well-behaved potential games with asymptotically well-
classified ones.
D Spectral properties of the logit dynamics
We next give other interesting spectral results about the transition matrix generated by the logit dynam-
ics. In particular, by using a matrix decomposition similar to the one adopted in the proof of Lemma 4.2
we can prove the following propositions. (We remark that results in this section do not need to assume
that the chain is reversible and indeed apply to every strategic game and not only to potential games.)
Proposition D.1. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. The trace of P is independent of β.
Proof. For every i and for every z−i consider the transition matrices Pi,z−i defined in (6), with L = S.
Let Si,z−i = {(z−i, si) | si ∈ Si}. Observe that for every x ∈ Si,z−i we have Pi,z−i(x,x) = 1 −∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (x,y). Hence, the trace of Pi,z−i is∑
x∈Si,z−i
Pi,z−i(x,x) = |Si| −
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x
P (x,y).
Since all non-zero elements in a column of Pi,z−i are the same we also have
Pi,z−i(x,x) =
1
|Si| − 1
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x
P (y,x).
By setting C =
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (x,y) =
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (y,x), we have
|Si| − C = C|Si| − 1 =⇒ C = |Si| − 1,
and thus, the trace of Pi,z−i is always 1, regardless of β. The proposition follows since the trace of P is
exactly the sum of the traces of all Pi,z−i’s.
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The proposition above says that if there exists an eigenvalue of P that gets closer to 1 as β increases,
then there are other eigenvalues that get smaller: this is very promising in the tentative to characterize
the entire spectrum of eigenvalues of P , necessary to use powerful tools such as the well-known random
target lemma (see, e.g., [25]).
In order to prove our last characterization of the transition matrix generated by the logit dynamics,
we prove the following lemma which gives a lower bound on the probability that the strategy profile is
not changed in one step of the logit dynamics for a generic game.
Lemma D.1. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. Then for every x ∈ S we have that
P (x,x) =
∑
i
P
(
(x−i, s?i ),x
)
,
where s?i 6= xi is an arbitrary strategy of player i.
Proof. Observe that
P (x,x) = 1−
∑
y∈N(x)
P (x,y) =
∑
i
 1
n
−
∑
y∈Ni(x)
P (x,y)

=
∑
i
1
n
1− ∑
y∈Ni(x)
eβui(y)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
 = ∑
i
1
n
eβui(x)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
.
The proof concludes by observing that for every i and for every s?i ∈ Si, we have
P
(
(x−i, s?i ),x
)
=
1
n
eβui(x)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
.
Lemma D.1 allows us to calculate the determinant of P .
Proposition D.2. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. The determinant of P is 0.
Proof. It is well-known that a matrix in which one row can be expressed as a linear combination of other
rows has determinant zero. In this proof, we fix a profile x and show that the row of P corresponding to
x can be obtained as a linear combination of other rows of the matrix. For each player i, fix a strategy
s?i ∈ Si such that s?i 6= xi. Let us denote with Sj , j = 0, . . . , n, the set of profiles y ∈ S obtained
from x by selecting j players i1, . . . , ij and setting their strategies to s?i1 , . . . , s
?
ij
, respectively. Notice
that x belongs to S0. By construction, for every profile z ∈ Sj , zi ∈ {xi, s?i }. Now, for i = 1, . . . , n,
consider the profile obtained from z by changing zi = xi into s?i or viceversa. Note that there are n of
such profiles which are neighbors of z and all contained in the sets Sj−1 and Sj+1. We claim that for
every y ∈ S
P (x,y) =
n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
z∈Sj
P (z,y). (14)
In order to prove the claim we distinguish three cases:
1. Let H(x,y) > 1 (and thus P (x,y) = 0): if there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that y ∈ Sj ,
then the r.h.s. of (14) becomes ±
(
P (y,y) −∑i P ((y−i, s?i ),y)) = 0, from Lemma D.1; if
y /∈ ⋃nj=0 Sj , then consider a profile z ∈ Sj , for some j = 1, . . . , n, such that z differs from y
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only in the strategy of player k: if no such profile exists, then the r.h.s. of (14) is 0; otherwise,
let us assume w.l.o.g. zk = xk (the case zk = s?k can be handled similarly), then the profile
z′ = (z−k, s?k) is a neighbor of y, belongs to the set S
j+1 and P (z,y) = P (z′,y): hence, this
two profiles delete each other in the r.h.s. of (14), giving the aimed result.
2. Let x,y differ in the strategy adopted by the player k: if y ∈ S1, then the r.h.s. of (14) becomes
P (y,y) −∑i 6=k P ((y−i, s?i ),y) = P (x,y), from Lemma D.1; if y /∈ ⋃nj=0 Sj , then, as above,
all profiles in
⋃n
j=0 S
j that differ from y only in one player i 6= k delete each other in the r.h.s.
of (14): thus, the only element that survives in the r.h.s. of (14) is P
(
(y−k, xk),y
)
= P (x,y).
3. If x = y, then the r.h.s. of (14) becomes
∑
i 6=k P
(
(y−i, s?i ),y
)
= P (x,x), from Lemma D.1.
Since, as observed above, the logit dynamics for potential games defines a reversible Markov chain,
Lemma 4.2 and Proposition D.2 imply that the last eigenvalue of the logit dynamics for these games
is exactly 0. (Note that in [3] is only stated the last eigenvalue is non-negative.) Moreover, from the
proof above, it turns out that an eigenvector of such zero eigenvalue is given by the function f : S → R
defined as
f(w) =

−1, if w ∈ Sj and j is even;
1, if w ∈ Sj and j is odd;
0, otherwise;
where the sets Sj’s are defined as in the above proof for some fixed profile x.
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